





TAILORING DISCOVERY: USING NONTRANSSUBSTANTIVE 
RULES TO REDUCE WASTE AND ABUSE 
JOSHUA M. KOPPEL† 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 244 
I. A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF DISCOVERY  
AND CRITICISMS THEREOF ...................................................... 247 
A. The Importance of Discovery in American Litigation ....................... 247 
B. The Breadth of the American Discovery System .............................. 248 
C. Criticisms of the Current System of Discovery .................................. 251 
II. TRANSSUBSTANTIVITY AND ITS LIMITS .................................... 256 
A. A History of Transsubstantive Rules  
and Transsubstantive Discovery ................................................... 256 
B. The Case for Transsubstantivity ................................................... 260 
C. The Limits of Transsubstantive Rules ............................................. 261 
III. JURISDICTIONS WITH NONTRANSSUBSTANTIVE  
DISCOVERY RULES ................................................................... 263 
IV. DISCOVERY REFORM ALTERNATIVES TO AND  
VARIATIONS ON NONTRANSSUBSTANTIVITY............................. 266 
A. Active Judicial Case Management ................................................ 267 
B. Value-of-Claim Tracks ................................................................ 270 
V. CREATING A SYSTEM OF NONTRANSSUBSTANTIVE  
RULES TO FIT MODERN DISCOVERY ......................................... 274 
A. A Nontranssubstantive Discovery Alternative ................................. 274 
 
† J.D., 2012, University of Pennsylvania; B.A., 2008, Brandeis University. The Author would 
like to thank Professor Stephen Burbank for his invaluable assistance and support throughout the 
process. 
A previous version of this Comment won the 2011 James William Moore Federal Practice 
Award from LexisNexis for an outstanding student paper on federal civil practice and procedure. 
  
244 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 243 
 
B. Accounting for Value-Based Judgments in the  
Creation of Nontranssubstantive Rules ........................................... 275 
1. Using Discovery to Promote Procedural Justice .................. 276 
2. Using Discovery to Promote Substantive Goals .................. 279 
C. Discovery Reforms that Will Reduce Costs ....................................... 281 
D. The Rulemaking Body ................................................................. 283 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 287 
INTRODUCTION 
The current system of discovery in the federal courts can produce enor-
mous costs for both litigants and the court system. These costs stem from 
the overuse of both discovery in general and costly mandatory discovery 
procedures that are relevant in only a small subset of litigation. The alleged 
costs of discovery have spawned a number of articles and studies in recent 
years condemning the federal system of broad discovery.1 
In a pair of recent cases, the Supreme Court responded to the criticism 
of rising discovery costs by instituting a heightened pleading standard 
meant to prevent meritless litigation from reaching the discovery stage.2 
Unfortunately, this crude attempt to rein in unnecessary discovery also 
threatens to kick much meritorious litigation out of the courts by prevent-
ing under-resourced plaintiffs from invoking the authority of the courts to 
gather basic information crucial to their cases.3 Better solutions to the 
problem of discovery costs would address the system of discovery itself. 
The primary problem with the current rules of discovery is that they 
sweep too broadly. Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are 
 
1 See, e.g., AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE 
AM. LEGAL SYS., UNIV. OF DENVER, FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE 
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE 
INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 2-3 (2009) 
[hereinafter IAALS REPORT], available at http://iaals.du.edu/library/publications/ACTL-IAALS 
_Final_Report_rev_8-4-10.pdf (noting that “discovery can cost far too much and can become an 
end in itself”); Gordon W. Netzorg & Tobin D. Kern, Proportional Discovery: Making It the Norm, 
Rather than the Exception, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 513, 522-32 (2010) (discussing the costs imposed by 
a broad system of discovery and suggesting reforms to limit “over-discovery”). 
2 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (noting that conclusory statements and 
threadbare allegations of wrongdoing will not suffice to “unlock the doors of discovery for a 
plaintiff”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (concluding that a requirement 
of more specific allegations at the pleading stage is probably the only way “to avoid the potentially 
enormous expense of discovery” in frivolous cases). 
3 See Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 140-66 (2011) 
(presenting data showing that cases that are more likely to be dismissed under the new heightened 
pleading standard are just as likely to be ultimately successful as those that would survive the new 
heightened pleading standard). 
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transsubstantive—meaning that the same rules apply in every type of case—
the discovery rules are not narrowly tailored to the requirements of any 
particular case. Transsubstantivity was one of the guiding tenets in the 
creation of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but the principle 
has come under attack more recently. 
The creation of substance-specific (nontranssubstantive) rules, especially 
in the area of discovery, holds promise for reducing costs by replacing broad 
rules with rules that are narrowly tailored to particular types of litigation. 
Narrowly tailored rules will help reduce waste and abuse in the discovery 
process. A system of nontranssubstantive rules will also allow rulemakers to 
make deliberate choices about how discovery can be used as a tool to 
promote goals of substantive and procedural fairness, thereby allowing rule-
makers to decide when costly discovery would or would not be appropriate. 
The drafting of nontranssubstantive rules would also present rulemakers 
with many challenges. The extent of discovery permitted in litigation can 
have an enormous effect on the course and outcome of a case. Therefore, 
rulemakers would have to make value-based decisions about how much and 
what types of discovery to allow in any given substantive area. This process 
would undoubtedly be beleaguered by heightened interest group lobbying.4 
Rulemakers recognize at least two kinds of transsubstantivity.5 “Case-
type” transsubstantivity means that the same rules apply regardless of the 
subject matter of the litigation (e.g., securities fraud, employment discrimi-
nation, breach of contract). “Case-size” transsubstantivity implies that the 
same rules apply regardless of the amount in controversy or the complexity 
of the suit.6 In this Comment, I seek to show that the federal system of 
discovery would benefit from nontranssubstantivity of both types, with a 
primary emphasis on case-type nontranssubstantivity. Ultimately, I argue 
that the discovery rules should be different for different types of litigation. 
In Part I, I provide a brief review of the current federal discovery rules 
by discussing their importance to litigation and the breadth of the system of 
discovery. I also review some of the most important criticisms that scholars 
 
4 To some extent, lobbying of rulemakers already occurs. Because the substance-specific 
rulemaking process would have to deal more openly with the value judgments associated with 
procedure, and because interested parties would be able to target more narrowly the procedures in 
which they have an interest, it is highly likely that substance-specific rulemaking would be 
susceptible to even more lobbying. See infra note 112. 
5 See Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting 
the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 378 (2010) (noting these two types of 
transsubstantive rules). 
6 This Comment uses the term “transsubstantivity” to mean case-type transsubstantivity, 
unless otherwise specified Correspondingly, “nontranssubstantive” rules are those that apply 
differently depending on the subject matter of the litigation. 
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and practitioners have leveled at the discovery procedures. Part II of this 
Comment focuses on transsubstantivity by examining the history of 
transsubstantive rules in the federal system and discussing the advantages 
and problems associated with transsubstantive rules. In Part III, I give 
examples of state jurisdictions that use nontranssubstantive discovery rules 
and examine a number of possible models. 
In order to place the nontranssubstantivity suggestion in a broader con-
text, Part IV examines two alternative reforms to the discovery rules. 
Analysis will show that the judicial discretion over discovery through active 
case management results in a waste of resources and impairs the ability of 
the courts to manage cases fairly and consistently. Reforms that would 
impose nontranssubstantivity of the case-size variety—that is, by applying 
different rules depending on the amount in controversy—should be 
successful in lowering the cost of discovery and streamlining case manage-
ment. The implementation of case-size nontranssubstantivity alone, 
however, would be insufficient to address the problems plaguing the current 
discovery system. Such a reform would do little to curb costs in the largest 
cases where broad discovery would still be available to litigants. 
In Part V, I propose a system of nontranssubstantive discovery rules 
that takes advantage of the benefits offered by these two alternative reform 
strategies. A nontranssubstantive system of discovery rules will reduce the 
overall cost of discovery through narrowly tailored rules. It will also allow 
rulemakers to allocate the costs of discovery in order to promote the 
substantive goals underlying the litigation, particularly for causes of action 
that Congress has previously sought to encourage through devices such as 
fee-shifting. The Comment goes on to discuss the process that the creation 
of nontranssubstantive discovery rules would entail. I assert that the 
primary challenge that rulemakers will face will be in making decisions that 
will determine how discovery rules should affect substantive law and 
substantive rights. I suggest a number of practical reforms that could be 
implemented in a nontranssubstantive system to reduce costs. 
Finally, this Comment proposes that the rulemaking committee that 
would be best equipped to craft a nontranssubstantive system of discovery 
rules would bring together experts and practitioners from all sides of the 
issue. Because of the substantive decisions that the committee would have 
to make and the political pressures from interest groups that it would have 
to confront, the rulemaking body would be best situated in the legislative 
branch. Although reform of the discovery system of the type recommended 
in this Comment would require a major overhaul of the federal discovery 
rules, nontranssubstantivity holds out the promise of narrowly drawn 
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procedures that would reduce costs while still providing litigants with the 
tools necessary for the efficient development of their cases. 
I. A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF DISCOVERY  
AND CRITICISMS THEREOF 
A. The Importance of Discovery in American Litigation 
Discovery plays an essential role in the modern system of American 
litigation. Modern American procedure assumes that “[m]utual knowledge 
of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper 
litigation.”7 Discovery is aimed at providing both the litigants and the 
factfinder with the information necessary to reach an accurate determina-
tion of the issues. In addition, ensuring that parties have access to all 
relevant facts to present to a neutral factfinder may further the important 
goal of procedural fairness.8 
Broad discovery is essential to a notice-pleading system in which a 
plaintiff is not required to know the facts necessary to succeed on his claim 
before initiating litigation. Broad discovery allows a plaintiff who knows 
merely that he has been wronged to leverage the power of the courts to gain 
access to the information that will allow him to prosecute a successful case.9 
Extensive discovery is thus essential to an effective system of notice 
pleading designed to provide advantages to under-resourced plaintiffs who 
cannot afford the private discovery required by a fact-pleading system. 
To the extent that the extensive system of federal discovery allows 
plaintiffs easier access to courts, discovery supports the political role that 
private litigation plays in the United States.10 In this system, the powerful 
 
7 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). 
8 Litigants who feel that they have been able to present a full picture to the factfinder are 
more likely to find the proceeding fair and to accept the determination of the factfinder. See infra 
subsection V.B.1. 
9 The recent decisions in Twombly and Iqbal may have significantly altered the notice-
pleading system and raised the bar for notice pleading, partly in an effort to curb the rising costs 
of discovery. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. However, to the extent that the plaintiff 
need not provide all of the evidence at the pleading stage, discovery will still be essential in 
allowing him to build his case. 
10 See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE 
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 21-31 (2010) (describing how congressional choices to encourage private 
litigation affect the level of enforcement of federal law); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to 
Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 71-77 
(2010) (describing the importance of pleading standards with regard to statutorily authorized 
private litigation); Seymour Moskowitz, Rediscovering Discovery: State Procedural Rules and the Level 
Playing Field, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 595, 600-01 (2002) (“Pretrial information gathering is critical, 
not only to individual cases, but also to the political role litigation plays in the United States.”). 
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force of private litigation can be harnessed, through legislative choice, as a 
method of enforcement of statutory and administrative law.11 Private 
litigation has indeed often been used as an alternative to a more bureau-
cratic state.12 Dean Carrington has noted the privatization of enforcement, 
especially in the areas of antitrust, consumer protection, securities regula-
tion, civil rights, and intellectual property law.13 In particular, Carrington 
argues that private litigation is most effective in protecting civil liberties 
and the rights of those with fewer resources, because private litigants cannot 
be co-opted by powerful interest groups as easily as administrative agencies.14 
Discovery is a powerful tool in enabling private litigants to vindicate their 
rights because it gives them investigative abilities that their limited 
resources would otherwise render unavailable.15 
B. The Breadth of the American Discovery System 
To support a notice-pleading system and private enforcement of statu-
tory law, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily prescribe an 
extremely broad system of discovery in which litigants can use multiple 
mechanisms to discover a vast range of information. Edson R. Sunderland, 
the main architect of the rules of discovery in the initial Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, created a uniquely extensive system of discovery by 
incorporating into the rules access to all of the known American, and 
perhaps English, devices of discovery.16 Whereas previous systems of 
discovery might have provided for one or two of these discovery mecha-
nisms (such as either interrogatories or depositions, but not both), Sunder-
 
11 See FARHANG, supra note 10, at 71-72 (“[W]ith private enforcement regimes Congress can 
hope to achieve its aims on the cheap, and to minimize blame for what implementation costs are 
borne by the government.”). 
12 For a larger discussion of the role of private litigation in the enforcement of statutory and 
administrative law and the legislative choices involved in such an allocation of enforcement power, 
see infra subsection V.B.2. Farhang notes that job discrimination lawsuits are the largest source of 
litigation in federal courts other than habeas petitions. See FARHANG, supra note 10, at 3. 
Although the legal bases for such suits are often federal statutes, 98% of these suits are litigated by 
private parties. See id. 
13 See Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997) (“Private 
litigants do in America much of what is done in other industrial states by public officers working 
within an administrative bureaucracy.”). 
14 See id. at 54-55 (“[I]t was confirmed a thousand times in the first half of this century that 
regulatory agencies tend to be co-opted by those whom they regulate.”). 
15 See Ken I. Kersch, The Reconstruction of Constitutional Privacy Rights and the New American 
State, 16 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 61, 84 (2002) (comparing discovery to the broad investigatory 
power given to administrative agencies). 
16 Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal 
Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 718 (1998). 
  
2012] Nontranssubstantivity and Discovery Reform 249 
 
land’s initial rules provided litigants in the federal system with access to any 
and all devices that might be of use to them.17 Sunderland’s motivation was 
his support for a notice-pleading system and his belief in discovery as a way 
to cure problems of “waste, delay, and unfairness.”18 By making all of the 
issues in dispute and relevant facts known to each of the parties and the 
court prior to trial, discovery would allow judges to dispose of meritless 
litigation through summary judgment, and permit attorneys to focus their 
efforts and time on better arguing the most important issues in those cases 
that did proceed to trial.19 
Due to various criticisms regarding the cost and time involved in such 
broad discovery, reform efforts since the 1970s have largely served to limit 
discovery.20 Thus, recent amendments have enhanced sanctions for discovery 
abuse, imposed numerical limits on the use of certain devices (depositions 
and interrogatories),21 and explicitly barred the use of disproportionate 
discovery.22 
The scope of discoverable materials has also been narrowed from the 
very broad “relevance to the subject matter” standard, although the court 
retains discretion to order subject matter discovery.23 The current rules still 
afford broad discovery by making discoverable “any nonprivileged matter 
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”24 Furthermore, discovery is 
still not limited to material that would be admissible at trial.25 All the 
 
17 See id. 
18 Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting 
Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 597-98 (2004). 
19 Id. 
20 See Moskowitz, supra note 10, at 607 (“The thrust of the amendments to the federal rules 
since then has been toward containing the cost and time expended on the exchange of pretrial 
information.”). 
21 Presumptive limits for certain discovery mechanisms have proven effective in reducing the 
use of those types of discovery. JUDICIAL CONF. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & 
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF 
THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 9 (2010) 
[hereinafter 2010 CIVIL LITIGATION CONFERENCE REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/2010%20report.pdf. Some have proposed placing such limits on 
other discovery devices, such as document requests and requests for admission. Id. 
22 See generally Moskowitz, supra note 10, at 607. 
23 Gregory S. Weber, Potential Innovations in Civil Discovery: Lessons for California from the 
State and Federal Courts, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1051, 1060-62 (2001). The effect of this 
narrowing of the basic scope of discovery is still debated. 2010 CIVIL LITIGATION CONFER-
ENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 8. 
24 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
25 Id. 
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original discovery devices are still available to litigants, even if some of 
them have been limited by subsequent amendments.26 
The current discovery process begins with initial disclosures. Except in 
certain exempted types of cases,27 each party must disclose the names of all 
individuals likely to have discoverable information that the disclosing party 
may use to support its claims or defenses.28 Each party must also disclose a 
copy of all the documents it may use to support its claims or defenses, a 
computation of damages claimed, and any insurance agreement under which 
an insurer may be liable for part of a possible judgment.29 In addition, each 
party must disclose to the other parties the names of any expert witnesses it 
may use at trial.30 Each expert witness must usually prepare a report about 
himself and the testimony he will offer at trial for inclusion in this disclo-
sure.31 Each party must also make a pretrial disclosure that lists the witnesses 
and exhibits that it plans to present at trial.32 
As early as possible in a proceeding, the parties are to confer to plan the 
discovery.33 At this meeting, the parties arrange for the required initial 
disclosures, discuss any issues about preservation of discoverable material, 
and develop a discovery plan.34 The discovery plan should describe the 
parties’ views on the proper scope and schedule of discovery, potential 
changes to the limitations on discovery imposed by the rules, and other 
discovery issues.35 This discovery plan may be followed by one or more 
pretrial conferences with the presiding judge.36 The district judge should 
issue a scheduling order that may modify the timing and extent of disclo-
sures and discovery, among other matters.37 
The federal rules provide for discovery through a limited number of oral 
depositions,38 depositions by written questions,39 or written interrogatories 
to parties.40 A party can also request that another party produce documents 
or physical evidence or permit entry onto property for inspection or 
 
26 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (1938), with FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (2010). 
27 Exempted cases are listed in FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B). 
28 Id. 26(a)(1)(A). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 26(a)(2). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 26(a)(3). 
33 Id. 26(f)(1). 
34 Id. 26(f)(2). 
35 Id. 26(f)(3). 
36 Id. 16(a)(1). 
37 Id. 16(b)(3). 
38 Id. 30. 
39 Id. 31. 
40 Id. 33. 
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testing.41 The court can order a party to submit to a mental or physical 
examination, the report of which may be available to all parties.42 The final 
method of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows 
parties to request that other parties admit the truth of certain pertinent 
matters; this device allows the parties to narrow the scope of the issues in 
question.43 
The court may usually alter the limitations on discovery.44 In particular, 
the court should limit discovery on its own or at the motion of a party when 
the burden of proposed discovery would be unreasonable.45 The court can 
issue a protective order forbidding or modifying discovery that could cause 
embarrassment or excessive burden to a party.46 A court can also issue an 
order to compel a resisting party to make the required disclosures and to 
respond to discovery requests.47 
The discovery system under the federal rules is broad in both the scope 
allowed and the variety of methods permitted. The disclosure requirements 
seek to expedite the process by requiring parties to turn over certain 
materials without making the opposing party submit a discovery request. 
The scheduling and pretrial conferences are also intended to make the 
process work more efficiently and predictably. However, there are numer-
ous circumstances that necessitate the court’s involvement in the discovery 
process, and the court is often expected to play some role in limiting 
discovery. 
C. Criticisms of the Current System of Discovery 
In the last thirty to forty years, the American system of broad discovery 
has come under attack as unfair, inefficient, and costly.48 Some scholars and 
practitioners, mostly defendants’ organizations, argue that parties are able 
to use the broad tools of discovery to impose costs on their adversaries that 
 
41 Id. 34(a). 
42 Id. 35. 
43 Id. 36. 
44 Id. 26(b)(2)(A). 
45 Id. 26(b)(2)(C). 
46 Id. 26(c)(1). 
47 Id. 37(a). 
48 According to one recent study, fewer than half of the trial lawyers surveyed opined that 
the discovery system works well. IAALS REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. Seventy-one percent thought 
that discovery is sometimes used to push an opposing party to settlement. Id. But see CTR. FOR 
CONST. LITIG., NINETEENTH CENTURY RULES FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY COURTS? 
1-2 & n.6 (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20 
Materials/Library/CCL,%2019th%20Century%20Rules%20for%2021st%20Century%20Courts.pdf 
(questioning the neutrality of the organization that published the IAALS Report). 
  
252 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 243 
 
push those adversaries toward settlement.49 Parties are incentivized to settle 
rather than incur the costs of litigation, even if they know that they would 
prevail on the merits. As Justice Souter asserted in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, “the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defend-
ants to settle even anemic cases.”50 The discovery costs for litigants should 
not only be measured in the cost of producing requested documents, 
answering interrogatories, or sitting for depositions; litigants are also 
burdened by the delay that discovery can create in litigation.51 
But the concern that blameless defendants may be pushed to settlement 
by the threat of discovery has been questioned. There is not enough 
empirical evidence to support these claims, and the evidence that does exist 
is ambiguous.52 Perhaps for that reason, critics of extensive discovery often 
resort to anecdotal evidence.53 A recent survey by the Federal Judicial 
Center found that 27.4% of plaintiffs’ attorneys and 30% of defendants’ 
attorneys reported that the costs of discovery increased the likelihood of 
settlement in a recent case about which they were questioned.54 However, 
the number of these cases in which the settlement was unfair is unclear. 
Discovery that exposes private corporate or personal information to the 
eyes of the public may also be deemed unfair.55 This type of discovery may 
 
49 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 647 (1989) (“The 
paradigm impositional discovery request comes from a party thinking it has a relatively small 
chance of prevailing . . . but wanting to convey the message: ‘This suit will cost you $1 million 
whether I win or not; we can split that in settlement.’”); Netzorg & Kern, supra note 1, at 523. 
50 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). 
51 Some of the increase in the median length of litigation in recent years has been attributed 
to the time required for extensive discovery. See Netzorg & Kern, supra note 1, at 523. In 1992, the 
median number of months before a civil case came to trial was fifteen; in 2008, the median case 
waited almost twenty-five months before coming to trial. Id. at 523-24. 
52 Miller, supra note 10, at 62-63 (“[T]he costs may be somewhat overstated—or partially 
self-inflicted—and certainly they are not universally imposed across the litigation universe . . . . 
The truth is that no one really knows. The empirical research has not investigated that deeply and 
it may prove difficult to reach beyond the impressionistic.”). 
53 Id. at 63 (noting that “there is no common definition of what is abusive or frivolous or 
excessive or purely tactical”); see, e.g., Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck, & Stephen B. Burbank, 
Debate, Plausible Denial: Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 141, 156-57 (2009) (Herrmann & Beck, Closing Statement), http://www.pennumbra. 
com/debates/pdfs/PlausibleDenial.pdf (citing the twenty million documents contained in the 
“electronic document depository in the Enron Securities Litigation”). 
54 EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL JUDI-
CIAL CENTER NATIONAL, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 32 (2009), available 
at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/ lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf. 
55 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2242 (1989) (“[P]roduction of the documents violates a 
principle of privacy which corporate and governmental officials consider ought to protect them. 
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subject the decisions of corporate and governmental officials to second-
guessing by the public and may lead government agencies and corporations 
to refrain from creating written communications or leaving paper or 
electronic records.56 Parties may be pushed to settle out of fear that their 
sensitive documents will be released in discovery. 
The current system of broad discovery is also likely to be inefficient in 
some cases, because it places the cost on the producing, rather than the 
requesting, party. Because this allocation of cost externalizes the cost of 
demanding more discovery, economic theory suggests that parties would 
conduct an inefficient amount of discovery.57 The limited ability of judges 
to predict the value of as-of-yet undiscovered information and the costs 
involved in litigating protective-order motions make Rule 26(b)(2)(C)—
which requires judges to limit discovery that would impose a burden that 
outweighs its potential benefit58—an imperfect solution to the inefficiency 
problem.59 Scholars and practitioners have come to terms with the idea that 
not every fact should be discoverable. Endless discovery mining for the 
missing nugget that might provide the factfinder with an additional fact 
may not be worth the cost; furthermore, it can often price litigants out of 
the system.60 The problem of inefficient discovery may also be compounded 
by the perverse incentives on attorneys to stretch out the discovery process 
in order to run up their clients’ bills. 
 
Corporate and government documents that are worth discovering express the thoughts of people 
with burdensome responsibilities making confidential decisions about tough and often insoluble 
problems.”); Kersch, supra note 15, at 85 (noting that the “sweeping and unprecedented, state-
supported powers to gather facts” that private lawyers possess on behalf of their private clients 
“clearly rais[e] anxieties about the value of privacy”). An early book on discovery published a few 
years before the promulgation of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure noted that 
discovery abuse was a concern in certain types of cases, even at that time. See GEORGE 
RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 30-31 (1932). In some types of actions—especially 
those relating to seduction, malicious prosecution, divorce proceedings, or election contests—
depositions were sometimes threatened as blackmail. Id. at 31. Newspapers would print sensational 
material obtained through the parties’ discovery, thereby embarrassing the litigants. Id. However, 
this type of abuse was infrequent, and to protect the parties’ privacy interests, the court could 
order depositions be kept confidential and sealed until offered into evidence. Id. 
56 Hazard, supra note 55, at 2242-43 (noting how the risk of such wide exposure has resulted 
in careful usage of written language). 
57 Easterbrook, supra note 49, at 637-38 (“Notice that both normal and impositional requests 
may inflict on the responding party costs substantially greater than the social value of the infor-
mation.”). 
58 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
59 See Easterbrook, supra note 49, at 638-39 (“Judicial officers cannot measure the costs and 
benefits to the requester and so cannot isolate impositional requests.”). 
60 See Netzorg & Kern, supra note 1, at 517-18 (noting that in order to make the civil justice 
system available to litigants with small claims, as well as those with large claims, “not every 
conceivably relevant fact should be discoverable”). 
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Even an attorney acting in furtherance of his client’s interests may ex-
ploit the delays accompanying discovery in order to increase the costs for 
the other party. Such conduct is tolerated by current professional responsi-
bility rules. The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct instruct a lawyer to “make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation 
consistent with the interests of the client.”61 Such delaying conduct is also not 
necessarily subject to sanction by a court.62 
The main criticisms of a system of broad discovery focus on its costs. In 
particular, document discovery is the most costly form of discovery, 
especially in an increasingly digitized world. Preserving and gathering the 
massive amounts of e-mails and electronic records produced by corporations 
can run the costs of some litigation into the millions of dollars.63 This 
problem is particularly perplexing due to the importance of document 
discovery, which often helps parties figure out which questions to ask in 
depositions.64 
The strength of the cost argument is unclear, however, because it is 
difficult to identify how many cases involve disproportionate discovery.65 
There are certainly some cases in which the cost of discovery is enormous. 
These cases may involve dozens of depositions, thousands of pages of 
documents, and hundreds of gigabytes of digitized information.66 However, 
many suits—perhaps one-half to one-third—involve no discovery, and in 
“the vast majority of cases,” discovery is in fact limited to a reasonable 
amount.67 Indeed, a report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules from 
the late 1990s suggests that discovery was not used at all in almost 40% of 
cases.68 However, discovery was costly in cases in which it was employed—
when actively utilized, discovery can represent as much as 90% of a case’s 
 
61 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.2 (1983) (emphasis added). 
62 Cf. Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 325 (1985) (“Within the 
limits of professional propriety, causing delay and sowing confusion not only are [the lawyer’s] 
right but may be his duty.” (quoting Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1267, 1288 (1975))). 
63 See Herrmann et al., supra note 53, at 156-57 (Herrmann & Beck, Closing Statement) 
(noting the authors’ personal and second-hand experience with litigation involving document 
preservation and e-discovery costs in the millions of dollars). 
64 See Hazard, supra note 55, at 2239. 
65 Subrin, supra note 5, at 392-93 (“We do not know if the so-called large cases constitute five 
percent, ten percent, or more of the entire federal docket.”). 
66 See id. at 392 (“[T]here [is] a substantial number of cases in which the amount of discovery 
is overwhelming by any standard . . . .”). 
67 Id.; see also 2010 CIVIL LITIGATION CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 7 (“Em-
pirical studies conducted over the course of more than forty years have shown that the discovery 
rules work well in most cases.”). 
68 H.R. Doc. No. 106-228, at 53 (2d Sess. 2000). 
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litigation costs. The excessive costs of discovery in such active cases means 
that, despite the fact that no discovery was used in many other cases, 
discovery nonetheless comprised about half of the total litigation costs in all 
cases.69 
A more recent survey of lawyers in recently closed cases, undertaken by 
the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), estimated that, at the median, discovery 
accounted for 20% to 27% of the costs of litigation.70 However, discovery 
expenditures only amounted to, at the median, between 1.6% and 3.3% of 
the stakes involved for the parties—a seemingly small price to pay.71 
Furthermore, although some defendants’ groups may make a lot of noise 
about the costs of discovery, the FJC survey suggests that most practition-
ers questioned regarding a representative sample of cases did not think that 
discovery was too expensive.72 Instead, over 50% of both plaintiffs’ and 
defendants’ attorneys questioned thought that the amount of information 
generated by discovery was “just the right amount,” and over 50% of both 
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys thought that the costs of discovery 
were “just right” compared to their clients’ stakes in the litigation.73 
Other criticisms of the federal system of discovery focus not on the use 
of discovery itself, but on the inefficiency and delay caused by the rules 
regulating discovery. Mandatory steps in the discovery process, such as 
initial disclosure and pretrial conferences,74 may cause unnecessary expense 
and delay in those cases where discovery is relatively simple.75 Additionally, 
much expense is generated by satellite litigation seeking to clarify the 
applicability of the discovery rules or in adjudicating motions for protective 
orders or orders to compel discovery. 
Critics of the current system of expansive discovery thus level attacks at 
the system on the basis of its unfairness, inefficiency, and cost. These 
criticisms are certainly accurate to some degree or in some cases, although 
the extent of the asserted problems is unclear. But even if the system of 
discovery is problematic only in a small subset of litigation, reforms should 
still attempt to lower the cost of discovery in those cases. Additional 
 
69 Id. 
70 LEE & WILLGING, supra note 54, at 2. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 27-28. 
73 Id. 
74 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (providing for pretrial conferences and orders meant, in part, 
to modify the extent and timing of discovery); id. 26(a)(1) (listing items that parties must disclose 
even before receiving a discovery request). 
75 See 2010 CIVIL LITIGATION CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 9; Subrin, supra 
note 5, at 389 (asserting that additional steps in the discovery process imposed to constrain the 
system only cause more expense). 
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empirical research should shed light on the extent of the problems and the 
types of cases in which they are most prevalent.76 Although the research 
currently available does not suggest that the system of federal rules permit-
ting broad discovery is completely broken, it does support serious consider-
ation of reform. 
II. TRANSSUBSTANTIVITY AND ITS LIMITS 
A. A History of Transsubstantive Rules and Transsubstantive Discovery 
The English common law system was distinctly nontranssubstantive; 
different writs were litigated pursuant to their own distinct procedures.77 In 
1848, the drafters of the Field Code in New York chose to break with the 
English common law tradition and employ transsubstantive rules of 
procedure.78 The Field Code was eventually adopted by over half the 
states.79 The drafters of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also 
chose transsubstantivity in the mid-1930s.80 
The Rules Enabling Act authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate 
“general rules” for “practice and procedure.”81 Based on this text, the Advisory 
Committee that drafted the Rules debated and ultimately rejected the 
contention that it could create different rules to be applied in district courts 
of different states. However, the Advisory Committee simply assumed, 
without debate, that the Rules should also be case-type transsubstantive.82 
It is not clear whether the Advisory Committee thought that the Rules 
Enabling Act required it to draft transsubstantive rules—as there is no 
record of any debate on the matter—but there are a number of explanations 
for its choice to draft the rules in this way. 
It took the English common law writs centuries to evolve procedures 
specific to each cause of action; it would be nearly impossible for a fourteen-
person committee to create substance-specific procedures in just a few 
 
76 In particular, class action, mass torts, and antitrust cases are reported to be particularly 
problematic in terms of discovery cost and abuse. Herrmann et al., supra note 53, at 156 
(Herrmann & Beck, Closing Statement). 
77 See Subrin, supra note 5, at 379. 
78 Id. at 378-81. 
79 Id. at 378. 
80 Id. 
81 Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (1934) (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)) (emphasis added). 
82 Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93 JUDICA-
TURE 109, 110-11 (2009). 
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years.83 Furthermore, simplicity was one of the primary goals underlying 
the push for a uniform set of federal procedures.84 The pre-1938 rules were 
extremely complicated: federal courts sitting in equity applied one set of 
rules while courts at law had to conform to the procedural codes of the 
states, which could contain thousands of sections.85 Additionally, there were 
“federal practice rules” for instances where the state code was inapplicable 
to the federal litigation.86 The Advisory Committee achieved the goal of 
simplicity through a single set of procedures to be used for all causes of 
action.87 
Another reason for the choice of transsubstantivity was that prevailing 
conceptions at the time held that procedure and substantive law were 
distinct entities.88 Procedure was not supposed to influence substantive 
outcomes.89 This conceptual distinction between procedure and substance 
was easiest to entertain if the procedures employed were not determined by 
the subject matter of the action.90 To create substance-specific procedure 
might admit that there were multiple valid ways to litigate and that the 
choice of procedure was based on substantive values.91 On a related point, 
to the extent that procedures crafted to fit a particular cause of action 
influenced the outcome of that litigation, the original rulemakers might 
have feared that the promulgation of nontranssubstantive rules would 
violate the Enabling Act’s directive to the Supreme Court not to “abridge, 
enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.”92 
 
83 Subrin, supra note 5, at 383. 
84 See id. 
85 See David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil 
Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 371 (2010) (“[A] federal judge in New York, for example, 
would have juggled equity rules, a procedural code with 1,536 sections, and special ‘federal practice 
rules’ for instances when the state code was inoperable or inapplicable for federal litigation.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
86 Id.  
87 The Rules Enabling Act specifically authorized the Supreme Court to create one set of 
rules for all causes of action, whether they were “cases in equity” or “actions at law.” Pub. L. No. 
73-415, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)). 
88 See Subrin, supra note 5, at 384. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. (“If different rules were to be drafted for different types of substantive cases, then 
procedure and substance look considerably less distinct . . . .”). 
91 See Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Persistence of Progressive Proceduralism, 61 TEX. L. REV. 
929, 945 (1983) (book review) (“If there is more than one scientifically valid way to litigate, then 
the choice of one or the other procedural system must be based on values; in other words, the 
selection of one mode of proceeding over another is a political choice.”). 
92 Rules Enabling Act § 1; see Subrin, supra note 5, at 384. 
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At common law, the rules of discovery were historically always trans-
substantive.93 By contrast, most matters of procedure traditionally followed 
the substance-specific dictates of writs.94 Thus, an important 1932 book by 
George Ragland on discovery in America and England noted that the norm 
in most jurisdictions was that discovery was available in any type of civil 
action.95 Although discovery was much more common in certain types of 
actions, particularly those involving automobile accidents or personal injury, 
the rules of discovery were transsubstantive.96 Ragland noted that there was 
discovery abuse at that time in certain types of cases—including seduction, 
malicious prosecution, and divorce proceedings—although it was considered 
infrequent.97 
The assumption that the federal rules should be transsubstantive has 
remained, despite recent calls for substance-specific reform in certain 
discrete rules.98 Congress has more recently enacted laws altering procedure 
in specific substantive areas, such as prison litigation99 and securities 
litigation.100 Many states have heightened pleading requirements in medical 
 
93 See RAGLAND, supra note 55, at 27 (“There are no prohibitions or restrictions upon the 
use of discovery, as far as the type of action is concerned, in most jurisdictions which have 
procedures for discovery before trial.”). 
94 See supra notes 77 & 83 and accompanying text. 
95 RAGLAND, supra note 55, at 27. 
96 See id. at 27-28 (noting the frequency of discovery in various types of actions). There were 
a few exceptions to this norm of transsubstantivity. Discovery was not permitted in actions to 
enforce forfeitures or penalties in England and Ontario on the grounds that courts of equity 
should not assist in the enforcement of penalties. Id. at 28; EDWARD BRAY, THE PRINCIPLES 
AND PRACTICE OF DISCOVERY 346 (London, Reeves & Turner 1885). These considerations 
gave rise to splits among the courts in whether there could be discovery in certain types of 
litigation. See RAGLAND, supra note 55, at 28-30. The Indiana courts did not permit discovery in 
divorce proceedings. Id. at 29; see also Simons v. Simons, 8 N.E. 37, 37 (Ind. 1886) (describing the 
use of interrogatories in divorce actions as “improper” because outside of the statutory scheme). 
Discovery was not permitted in summary actions in New York because the delay it entailed was 
deemed to be inconsistent with the legislative purpose in creating such actions. Dubowsky v. 
Goldsmith, 202 A.D. 818, 818-19 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922); RAGLAND, supra note 55, at 29.  
97 RAGLAND, supra note 55, at 31. 
98 Burbank, supra note 82, at 111. 
99 See, e.g., Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, sec. 802, § 3626(e)(2), 110 
Stat. 1321-66, 1321-68 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2) (2006)) (allowing for 
automatic stay of prospective relief upon motion to modify or terminate such relief); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(d) (limiting the amount of compensable attorney’s fees); § 1997e(g) (allowing for waiver 
of reply). The Prison Litigation Reform Act was meant to address the burden on the courts posed 
by an overwhelming amount of prisoner lawsuits and the problem of prison micromanagement by 
judges. Marcus, supra note 85, at 404-06. 
100 The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 altered procedure in an attempt to 
prevent abusive claims. Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101, 109 Stat. 737, 737; see H.R. REP. 104-369, at 31-
32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). Its provisions heighten pleading standards, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1), allow 
for a stay of discovery pending disposition of a motion to dismiss, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B), and 
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malpractice suits.101 But no one is advocating a return to a system with 
totally different procedural rules for different areas of substantive law.102 
Nevertheless, there has recently been a push for substance-specific rules 
of discovery. Thus, although they have largely copied the procedures found 
in the federal rules since their promulgation in 1938, states have recently 
begun to abandon the federal model of transsubstantive discovery rules.103 
There are currently hundreds of variations among discovery rules through-
out the country.104 
A push for nontranssubstantive discovery rules has also been seen at the 
federal level. In recent months, with the encouragement of the Judicial 
Conference Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
team formed by the National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA) 
has begun working on pattern interrogatories and pattern requests for 
production for use in employment discrimination litigation.105 A plaintiff in 
a relevant case would have the opportunity to submit these standardized 
interrogatories or requests for production to the defendant with his com-
plaint, and the defense could then attach its own set of pattern interrogatories 
or requests to his answer.106 The goal of this project is to identify those 
types of discovery requests standard in employment discrimination cases 
 
lay out the requirements for the selection of the lead plaintiff in a class action, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(a)(3)(B). 
101 See Benjamin Grossberg, Comment, Uniformity, Federalism, and Tort Reform: The Erie 
Implications of Medical Malpractice Certificate of Merit Statutes, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 222-25 (2010) 
(surveying state certificate of merit statutes that require the plaintiff to consult with an expert 
prior to or just after filing suit); see also Marcus, supra note 85, at 407-09 (noting that many state 
legislatures passed the certificate of merit statutes as part of a larger program of substantive 
reform of medical malpractice liability, thereby underscoring the use of procedural rules as a 
mechanism to influence substantive outcomes). 
102 Burbank, supra note 82, at 111. 
103 See Marcus, supra note 85, at 404 (“[S]tate legislatures have enacted substance-specific 
procedural reforms to accomplish particular goals of substantive policy.”); see also Weber, supra 
note 23, at 1052 (describing the interest of the California Law Revision Commission in discovery 
reform and suggesting models of nontranssubstantivity after surveying variations in the discovery 
laws in each of the states). 
104 Weber, supra note 23, at 1052 (noting the “hundreds of differences” in discovery rules 
across the states). 
105 Memorandum from Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 14 
(Dec. 6, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ 
CV12-2010.pdf; see infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text for discussion regarding pattern 
interrogatories. 
106 Memorandum from Joseph D. Garrison, NELA Liaison to the Advisory Comm., & 
Rebecca M. Hamburg, NELA Program Dir., to Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Judicial Conf. Advisory 
Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure 2 (Oct. 20, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2010-11.pdf at 627. 
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that are least objectionable to the parties.107 Strong presumptions in favor of 
the appropriateness of discovery contained in these protocols would 
discourage disputes at this stage.108 The use of pattern discovery would 
make the discovery process for this information quicker and less costly. 
NELA hopes that upon completion of the pattern discovery sets, a pilot 
project will be undertaken to test the workability of pattern discovery.109 
While the use of pattern discovery may speed the initial discovery process 
in certain cases by identifying what material is likely to be most relevant to 
the litigation, the project does not seek to alter the underlying discovery 
rules, which would remain generally applicable. Nevertheless, this project 
evidences a first attempt in the federal system to tailor discovery mecha-
nisms to the substance of the litigation. 
B. The Case for Transsubstantivity 
The main arguments for transsubstantivity remain those that likely in-
fluenced the Advisory Committee when it drafted the original Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.110 Promulgating a single set of transsubstantive 
rules greatly simplifies the federal judicial system for practitioners. Lawyers 
and judges must learn only a single set of rules, and need not grapple with 
the question of which rules should apply when substantive categories of law 
overlap. Retaining the transsubstantive system means that Congress (or a 
rulemaking committee) does not have to take on the burdensome task of 
debating and enacting rules for each cause of action. 
As briefly noted above, transsubstantive rules also have the benefit of 
largely, though not completely, removing value judgments from the task of 
crafting procedure. Transsubstantive rules force rulemakers to work at a 
level of abstraction at which it is difficult to affect materially the outcomes 
in a particular substantive area of law.111 Because the rulemakers are not 
asked to make political or social decisions, transsubstantivity reduces the 
risk of interest groups asserting pressure to influence particular areas of law.112 
 
107 Id. 
108 See id. at 3 (noting the potential for pattern discovery to reduce the need for costly multi-
ple rounds of motions). 
109 Id. 
110 See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text. 
111 See Marcus, supra note 85, at 379. 
112 See Miller, supra note 10, at 124-25 (noting that reform to a nontranssubstantive system 
would likely be influenced by client interests); Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, the Adversary System, 
and Procedural Reform in Medical Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 1011 (2004) (“[I]f 
the federal rulemakers considered rules targeted at specific kinds of litigation, the resulting rules 
would favor the interests of those groups that were best able to influence the rulemaking 
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Because transsubstantive rules must be broadly formulated in order to 
be applicable to every substantive area, Geoffrey Hazard has asserted that 
an additional benefit of these rules is that they allow for change and legal 
development from unexpected avenues.113 Thus, one advantage of broad 
discovery rules, as opposed to narrowly tailored rules, is that they allow for 
more flexibility and creativity in unexpected ways. Lawyers practicing 
under broad rules are less constrained by rulemakers who may be stuck in 
traditional ways of thinking. 
C. The Limits of Transsubstantive Rules 
The problems associated with transsubstantive rules largely arise from 
the fact that such rules are by necessity overly broad when applied in any 
particular case.114 Because the rules must fit any type of litigation, they lack 
the crisp applicability and incisiveness of narrowly drawn rules, and can 
thereby result in a waste of time and money.115 The broad rules are often 
not sufficient to guide the course of litigation, and therefore the system 
depends on additional limiting procedures and judicial discretion to give 
 
process.”). To some extent, special interest groups already lobby Congress to enact procedural 
reforms that most benefit them. See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of 
Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1705 (2004) (“[L]obbying by lawyers and others led 
members of Congress to perceive that some issues of court practice and procedure either could be 
used to generate political support among certain interest groups or in any event might require 
attention in order to preserve such support.”). It is true that even in a transsubstantive system, 
interest groups can and will make calculations about how particular rules will help them in those 
cases that matter to them. For example, the Chamber of Commerce might calculate that 
heightened pleading standards would help large corporations by protecting them from shareholder 
suits. See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 18-26, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (No. 05-1126) (urging the 
Court to consider the risk of abusive litigation and adopt a higher pleading standard). Even 
though such standards might hurt business in other types of cases, such as contract disputes, the 
Chamber might have calculated that on average heightened pleading standards help big business. 
The effects of such lobbying, however, are likely dampened in a transsubstantive system because 
interest groups and rulemakers must work at a certain level of generality. See Linda S. Mullenix, 
Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 
795, 837 (1991) (arguing that if the Civil Rules Advisory Committee makes the transition to 
nontranssubstantive rules, “[i]nterest group lobbyists represent[ing] partisan interests . . . will 
pressure for interest-specific procedural rules”). 
113 Hazard, supra note 55¸at 2246-47 (“Formulation of new theories of legal rights is simpler, 
virtually by definition, under a pleading system that is not constructed in terms of old legal 
categories, as was code pleading and common law pleading. Proof of new theories of liability 
likewise is simpler with the aid of comprehensive discovery.” (footnote omitted)).  
114 See Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for 
Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 41 (1994) (“It is this perceived need to 
cover all cases with one rule which leads to less effective restraints throughout the process.”). 
115 Subrin, supra note 5, at 388. 
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sufficient guidance. Disclosure, discovery conferences, scheduling confer-
ences, and pretrial conferences are all meant to provide additional opportu-
nities to narrow the application of the rules, but they also require additional 
expenditure of resources.116 In the absence of such narrowing processes, 
disputes over the applicability of the rules are likely to arise, thereby 
causing only more delay and cost.117 
If narrowly crafted rules provided sufficient direction to litigation ex 
ante, however, these expensive and time-consuming narrowing procedures 
could be avoided. For example, if there were particular rules for discovery 
in medical malpractice suits, discovery conferences in such cases might be 
unnecessary to prevent discovery abuse because the parties would already be 
limited by narrowly drawn rules. 
A further problem inherent in employing overly broad rules is that 
much discretion is necessarily left to the judge in determining how the rules 
should be narrowed and applied in a particular case.118 Discretion can be 
problematic, as similar cases may be treated differently depending on the 
presiding judge.119 Because procedure can have a great effect on outcome, 
transsubstantive rules may, ironically, sacrifice uniformity of result.120 
Although a certain amount of flexibility may be desirable, such flexibility 
should be built into the rules intentionally, rather than as a necessary safety 
valve for overbroad rules. 
Some critics of the transsubstantive nature of the federal rules note that 
some of the factors that motivated the original Advisory Committee to use 
transsubstantive rules are no longer applicable. Simplicity may not be as 
necessary today as it was in 1938 because modern lawyers and many judges 
focus their practices on specialized areas of law.121 Thus, lawyers and judges 
will have no problem learning and employing the relevant procedures. 
Furthermore, substance-specific rules may be more necessary now because 
more complicated fields of litigation, requiring more specialized procedures, 
 
116 See id. at 389. 
117 See Subrin, supra note 114, at 40 (noting the “interpretive disputes” caused by the auto-
matic disclosure provisions). As an example of the uncertainty caused by the overbroad rules, 
Subrin notes that the automatic disclosure rules are drafted so broadly that in complex cases like 
product liability, toxic tort, patent, and securities class actions, automatic disclosure rules, in the 
absence of any limiting principle, may create endless piles of disclosed documents. Id. at 38-40. 
118 For a discussion of problems inherent in active judicial case management, see infra  
Section IV.A. 
119 See Subrin, supra note 5, at 391. 
120 Id. 
121 Marcus, supra note 85, at 372-73. 
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have arisen since 1938.122 A primary example of this phenomenon is the 
class action lawsuit, which can involve millions of plaintiffs.123 
In contrast to transsubstantive rules, substance-specific rules can be 
narrowly tailored to the needs of the particular type of litigation. Fewer 
disputes over the applicability of the rules and less need to further narrow 
the requirements of the rules would allow judges to be less involved in 
discovery—thus giving them more time to hear other cases on the merits—
and would save money and time.124 
III. JURISDICTIONS WITH NONTRANSSUBSTANTIVE  
DISCOVERY RULES 
To a limited extent, some of the federal rules of discovery are already 
nontranssubstantive: in particular, some of the disclosure rules are non-
transsubstantive. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(B) exempts nine 
types of cases from the initial disclosure requirements. These types of cases 
include petitions for habeas corpus, actions to quash an administrative 
summons, and actions to enforce an arbitration award.125 In amending the 
disclosure provisions to include these exceptions in 2000, the Advisory 
Committee intended to identify cases where there was likely to be little or 
no discovery and thus where disclosure would not contribute to the effective 
development of the case.126 Because the rules prior to the 2000 amendments 
permitted local rules to alter the requirements of disclosure, the committee 
looked to the categories of cases that had been excluded by local rules.127 At 
the time, the committee thought that these exceptions would be applicable 
in about one third of all civil filings.128 
A number of states have also experimented with nontranssubstantive 
discovery rules to some extent. Various states exempt broad classes of cases 
from disclosure requirements. Alaska rules create an exemption from state 
disclosure requirements in adoption,129 paternity, custody, small claims, and 
 
122 See id. at 372 (noting “enormously complicated fields of litigation that beg for specialized 
procedural treatment”). 
123 Id. 
124 See Subrin, supra note 114, at 50 (“Finally, judges can begin to return to their proper 
roles—deciding, or facilitating the decision of cases on their merits; making decisions about cases 
that apply to more than the one case that is in front of them; and having rules to guide them in 
their future decisions.”). 
125 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B). 
126 See id. 26 advisory committee note (2000 amend.). 
127 See id. 
128 Id. 
129 ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26(a). 
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eminent domain cases, among other types of litigation.130 The Colorado 
rules exempt mental health, water law, forcible entry and detainer, and 
certain other proceedings from the normal disclosure procedures.131 Alaska 
and Colorado both have separate disclosure rules that dictate different 
disclosure procedures for divorce and legal separation cases.132 In addition 
to exempting cases in some of the categories already mentioned, Utah 
further exempts from the disclosure requirements actions for reviewing 
proceedings of an administrative agency, for post-conviction or extraordinary 
relief, to enforce an arbitration award, and for water rights adjudication.133 
Another popular device among the states is uniform or pattern interrog-
atories, which set out a list of standard questions to be answered by the 
litigants in certain types of cases.134 Some states require parties to answer 
the standard interrogatories, while others only encourage their use. For 
instance, Arizona incentivizes the use of the “Uniform Interrogatories” in 
medical malpractice, personal injury, and contract cases135 by providing that 
each uniform interrogatory and its subparts shall be counted as only one 
interrogatory toward the forty interrogatory limit, while any subpart to a 
nonuniform interrogatory will be counted as its own interrogatory.136 
Connecticut, in contrast, limits the use of interrogatories in personal 
injury actions arising from the operation or ownership of a motor vehicle or 
the ownership of real property exclusively to its uniform interrogatories, 
unless a judge orders otherwise.137 The rule does not require that the 
uniform interrogatories be used in every case, and a party only need answer 
the interrogatories if served with them.138 The New Jersey rules demon-
 
130 Id. 16(g). 
131 COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(a). 
132 ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26.1; COLO. R. CIV. P. 16.2(e). 
133 UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(a)(3)(A). 
134 Seymour Moskowitz, Discovery in State Civil Procedure: The National Perspective, 35 W. ST. 
U. L. REV. 121, 125-26 (2007). As mentioned supra in notes 105-09 and accompanying text, a 
recent effort is underway to experiment with nonmandatory pattern discovery in the federal 
courts. 
135 The rules provide forms of interrogatories labeled with these categories. However, the 
rules provide that the uniform interrogatories can be used in any type of proceeding. ARIZ. R. 
CIV. P. 33.1(f). 
136 ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 33.1(a), 84 forms 4-6. Colorado and Maryland have similar rules. See 
COLO. R. CIV. P. 33(e) (“Any pattern interrogatory and its subparts shall be counted as one 
interrogatory. Any subpart to a non-pattern interrogatory shall be considered as a separate 
interrogatory.”); MD. R. CIV. P. 2-421(a) (“Each form interrogatory contained in the Appendix to 
these Rules shall count as a single interrogatory.”). 
137 CONN. R. CIV. P. 13-6(b). The relevant forms are located in the appendix to the rules. Id. 
138 Id. 13-6(a) (“In any civil action . . . any party may serve . . . written interrogatories . . . .”) 
(emphasis added); see also id. 13-6(c) (setting forth the procedure for serving the form interrogato-
ries on a party represented by counsel). 
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strate a third variation, in which the parties in an action subject to uniform 
interrogatories are automatically deemed to have been served with the 
uniform interrogatories, which they must then answer, upon being served 
with the complaint or answer to the complaint.139 
Some states limit requests for production in a similar manner. In Con-
necticut, requests for production are limited in certain types of cases to 
those set out in forms.140 
Many states have medical malpractice “certificate of merit” statutes that 
require a plaintiff in a malpractice action to consult with an expert when 
filing suit.141 These statutes may alter the general discovery rules by 
determining the timing of expert-report disclosures and permitting (or 
requiring) the discovery of advice from nontestifying experts, even where 
the discovery rules might otherwise preclude such discovery.142 Some states, 
such as Arizona, further modify the discovery rules for medical malpractice 
cases.143 
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida has a case 
management system that separates cases into three tracks depending on 
their complexity.144 The first track is reserved for actions for review of an 
administrative record, habeas corpus petitions or other challenges to a 
criminal conviction, actions brought without counsel by a person in custody, 
actions to enforce or quash an administrative summons, actions by the 
United States to recover benefit payments or collect on student loans, 
proceedings ancillary to proceedings in other courts, and actions to enforce 
an arbitration award.145 The third track contains class action, antitrust, 
securities, mass tort, and other complex litigation, as well as actions 
 
139 N.J. R. CIV. P. 4:17-1(b)(2). England has pre-action protocols that describe standard 
disclosures that the parties should undertake even before commencing an action. See CIV. P.R., 
Practice Direction: Pre-Action Conduct 1.2 (Eng.), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/ 
procrules_fin/contents/practice_directions/pd_pre-action_conduct.htm (stating that it is a goal of 
the Practice Direction to encourage parties to exchange information prior to suit); see also, e.g., 
CIV. P.R., Pre-Action Protocol for Personal Injury Claims, Annex B (Eng.), available at http:// 
www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/protocol/prot_pic (listing standard information to 
be disclosed by the parties prior to the commencement of various types of personal injury actions). 
140 CONN. R. CIV. P. 13-9(a) (providing that in all vehicular and real property–related 
personal injury actions, all requests for production “shall be limited to those set forth in Forms 
204, 205 and/or 206 of the rules of practice, unless, upon motion, the judicial authority determines 
that such requests for production are inappropriate or inadequate”). 
141 Grossberg, supra note 101, at 218. 
142 Id. at 257-60. 
143 See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.2 (mandating the exchange of certain records and limiting dis-
covery in medical malpractice cases). 
144 M.D. FLA. R. 3.05. 
145 Id. 3.05(b)(1). 
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affecting the public interest in a way that warrants heightened judicial 
attention, such as school desegregation or voting rights cases.146 All other 
cases fall into track two.147 Track-one cases are managed by the presiding 
judge or a magistrate judge according to the ordinary rules,148 except that 
they are exempt from the initial disclosure requirements of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(a)(1).149 In track-two cases, counsel are additionally 
required to meet and file a Case Management Report that includes a 
detailed discovery plan and timeline, among other requirements.150 The 
court may then order a preliminary pretrial conference with the parties 
before it issues a Case Management and Scheduling Order establishing a 
discovery plan, and additional pretrial conferences as necessary.151 In track-
three cases, the preliminary pretrial conference is required.152 
States also use substance-specific discovery rules in other ways. The 
New York rules attempt to minimize the burden on producing parties in 
personal injury or injury to property cases by not permitting a party to 
serve interrogatories on and conduct a deposition on the same party.153 
Wisconsin places numerical limits specifically on discovery by prisoners 
appearing pro se and provides for an automatic stay of discovery upon a 
motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment, unless the court 
decides that the prisoner has a reasonable chance of prevailing on the 
merits.154 
Numerous variations of nontranssubstantive discovery rules exist among 
the states, and the movement for nontranssubstantive discovery rules is 
growing. The most common rules exempt certain types of litigation from 
disclosure, streamline the discovery of basic information in simple cases 
through the use of pattern discovery, or limit the use of discovery to a 
certain number of incidents in particular kinds of cases. 
IV. DISCOVERY REFORM ALTERNATIVES TO AND  
VARIATIONS ON NONTRANSSUBSTANTIVITY 
The most balanced proposals for reform for the federal system of dis-
covery focus on ways to give litigants direction in the discovery process in a 
 
146 Id. 3.05(b)(3). 
147 Id. 3.05(b)(2). 
148 Id. 3.05(c)(1). 
149 Id. 3.05(d). 
150 Id. 3.05(c)(2)(B). 
151 See id. 3.05(c)(2)(D).  
152 See id. 3.05(c)(3)(C). 
153 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3130 (McKinney 2012). 
154 See WIS. STAT. § 804.015 (2012). 
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more narrowly tailored manner. Aside from a shift to substance-specific 
rules, two other proposals have received attention by scholars and rule-
makers. The first would have judges more actively manage discovery. The 
second would have different discovery rules apply to different cases, 
depending on the value of the claim. Neither of these proposals would do 
enough to rein in discovery costs, however, and each would raise new 
problems for the system. 
A. Active Judicial Case Management 
One proposed solution to the abuse and overuse of discovery is to have 
judges take an active role in managing discovery.155 Judges would examine 
discovery requests to ensure that they are reasonably aimed at uncovering 
useful information and that the cost of the requested discovery is reasonable 
in comparison to the expected value of the information sought. Such an 
approach would necessarily grant more discretion to judges to make 
individualized determinations in their cases. Case management has already 
taken a particularly central role in reforms aimed at e-discovery.156 Amend-
ments to the federal rules since the 1980s have sought to strengthen judicial 
case management by expanding the role of pretrial conferences and schedul-
ing and granting the trial judge the authority to restrict excessive or 
redundant discovery.157 
In some sense, judicial discretion itself breaks the transsubstantive nature 
of the rules because judges are able to authorize more discovery in areas of 
litigation that they feel to be more important, such as civil rights litiga-
tion.158 On the other hand, as long as individual judicial proclivities balance 
each other out, the system as a whole will not be lending extra support to 
 
155 For a discussion tracing the development of the case management system, see Steven S. 
Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 674-88 (2010). For a 
more in-depth discussion of the debate surrounding a system of rules that emphasizes case 
management and judicial discretion, see id. at 688-743. 
156 Id. at 682-83. 
157 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (providing for a pretrial conference and scheduling order); Miller, 
supra note 10, at 55 (“The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules . . . were an attempt to reduce 
cost and delay by giving district judges the tools to prevent excessive discovery and to take a more 
active role in moving cases through pretrial and encouraging settlement.”). 
158 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of 
Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1929 (1989) (arguing that federal procedure is not uniform 
because the rules “empower district judges to make ad hoc decisions”); Marcus, supra note 85, at 
377 (noting scholars who make the argument that the rules are only superficially transsubstantive 
because of the discretion they give to judges). 
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particular substantive areas of litigation, as it would be with explicit, 
generally applicable nontranssubstantive rules.159 
A 1996 report commissioned by the Judicial Conference of the United 
States contained a mixed analysis of active judicial case management: case 
management was reported to reduce delay in litigation, but add significantly 
to the cost to the courts.160 One of the main purported advantages of case 
management is that the judge will set an earlier cut-off date for discovery, 
rather than let the parties extend discovery indefinitely. The report found, 
predictably, that a shorter time to discovery cut-off was associated with 
reduced time to case disposition and reduced lawyer work hours.161 A 
shorter discovery period also reduced the cost to litigants.162 However, a 
shorter period for discovery was not significantly associated with changes in 
either attorney or litigant satisfaction.163 
Active judicial management of discovery, however, causes more prob-
lems than it solves. A judge supervising discovery cannot possibly know the 
true value of any particular discovery request before the information is 
produced.164 Therefore, judicial case management inherently involves large 
amounts of uncontrolled judicial discretion, which raises concerns about 
fairness and impartiality.165 Discovery orders are often made off the record 
or are announced without an opinion, making any partiality difficult to 
detect and control.166 Discovery orders are usually not final and are thus not 
appealable; this insulation exacerbates any problems of partiality and 
variance among judges.167 
 
159 See Marcus, supra note 85, at 378 (“[N]othing in the discretion that the Federal Rules 
provide manifests a systemic approval or disapproval of a particular substantive area of litigation.”). 
160 JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, JUST, SPEEDY, AND 
INEXPENSIVE?: AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL 
JUSTICE REFORM ACT 14 (1996), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/ 
MR800.pdf; see also Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound 
Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 93 (1997) (citing KAKALIK 
ET AL., supra, at 1-2). 
161 KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 160, at 16. 
162 Id. But see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (“[T]he success of judi-
cial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.”). 
163 KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 160, at 16. 
164 See Easterbrook, supra note 49, at 638-39 (“Judicial officers cannot measure the costs and 
benefits to the requester and so cannot isolate impositional requests.”). 
165 See Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 424-31 (1982) (discussing 
the vast power granted to judges in a system with active case management and the concomitant 
threat to impartiality). 
166 Moskowitz, supra note 134, at 127. 
167 See id.; Resnick, supra note 165, at 380 (“[B]ecause managerial judging is less visible and 
usually unreviewable, it gives trial courts more authority and at the same time provides litigants 
with fewer procedural safeguards to protect them from abuse of that authority.”). 
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Active judicial case management also diminishes the predictability of 
litigation and the participatory roles of the community—in designing 
procedure—and the litigants—in controlling the manner in which their case 
is decided.168 Furthermore, active management of litigation consumes large 
amounts of judicial resources169 and takes away from the time that judges 
are able to devote to presiding over trials.170 As Professor Arthur Miller, 
then the Reporter to the Advisory Committee, said, the federal rules have 
“sold the judges into slavery” by making them “gatekeepers” charged with 
controlling the extent of discovery.171 Rules that mandate pretrial confer-
ences and other forms of active case management are particularly problem-
atic because they result in an expenditure of resources even in the large 
number of cases where discovery would otherwise play a minimal role.172 
Robert Bone has suggested that giving judges “discretionary control over 
discovery invites parties to contest discovery matters vigorously, which 
compounds litigation costs and creates opportunities for strategic abuse.”173 
 
168 Subrin, supra note 160, at 94. Professor Subrin notes the ways in which judicial case 
management reduces community participation in litigation: 
To the extent case management is truly ad hoc, the community, acting through advi-
sory committees or Congress, has not participated in setting boundaries for the case. 
To the extent that settlement is not only facilitated in a friendly way, but “urged” in 
a more compelling fashion, party participation and community participation, through 
the jury, are diminished. To the extent that judges are case-managing, they are not 
deciding cases on the merits in open court, nor are they presiding over jury trials. 
Id. 
169 See Subrin, supra note 5, at 398 (“[C]ase management for all cases has the flaw of requiring a 
good deal of judicial time.”). Subrin points out that in 1998, there were approximately one million 
lawyers in the United States and 10,000 judges. Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: 
Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 299, 310 (2002). Thus, there are not nearly enough judges to 
assume the work of pretrial discovery currently performed by lawyers. Id.; see also Resnick, supra 
note 165, at 423-24 (“The judge’s time is the most expensive resource in the courthouse.”). 
170 See Carrington, supra note 13, at 61 (arguing that the most important function of district 
judges is to try cases and that it would be a great loss if increased case management responsibilities 
for judges took them away from that primary task). For a discussion of the negative effects of the 
diminishing rate of trials, see Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: 
Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 401-03 (2011). 
171 ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO 
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGE-
MENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 32 (1984), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/ 
lookup/1983amnds.pdf/$file/1983amnds.pdf. 
172 See Subrin, supra note 160, at 93-94 (arguing that because most cases do not produce 
problematic discovery costs, it does not make sense to require judicial intervention in the average 
case); see also supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (noting that a large number of cases involve 
minimal or no discovery). 
173 Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1961, 1964 (2007). 
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Indeed, the American legal system demonstrates an historic distrust of 
giving this much power to a single entity, such as the judge.174 The right to 
a jury trial, the adversary system, and the principles of federalism and 
separation of powers are all meant to control the power of the judge.175 
Although certain amounts of judicial discretion will always be necessary, 
and most often harmless, allowing judges broad, unreviewable authority to 
control the course of discovery is neither a workable nor a wise solution to 
the problems associated with modern discovery. 
B. Value-of-Claim Tracks 
A narrower variation on nontranssubstantivity, which until now this 
Comment has broadly taken to mean rules that apply different procedures 
in different types of cases, is to apply different procedures depending on the 
size of the claim. In such a system, cases are assigned to a track, with its 
own set of procedures, based on the value of the claim, without regard to 
the subject matter of the suit. Variations on this model might also take the 
subject matter of the suit into account when assigning the case to a track. 
The authors of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure designed the Rules 
for complex litigation to be applicable in all cases.176 However, Professor 
Weber has argued that greater efficiency can be obtained through the 
creation of rules specifically for simple or low-stakes litigation.177 The 
incentives for attorneys to use discovery to produce cost and delay for the 
opposing party are particularly strong in smaller cases, because an economi-
cally rational litigant will focus on the proportion of threatened litigation 
costs to the amount in controversy in deciding its settlement posture.178 
Therefore, rules aimed at limiting discovery in smaller cases may be 
particularly effective. 
A number of states have implemented variations of the value-of-claim 
tracks model.179 Texas has implemented a three track system which treats 
 
174 Subrin, supra note 169, at 309. 
175 See id. 
176 See Mark C. Weber, The Federal Civil Rules Amendments of 1993 and Complex Litigation: A 
Comment on Transsubstantivity and Special Rules for Large and Small Federal Cases, 14 REV. LITIG. 
113, 115-26 (1994) (describing how the development of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
resulted in their being tailored especially for complex litigation). 
177 See id. at 130 (suggesting that “special rules for smaller cases” would “increase speed and 
reduce cost in federal civil justice without seriously detracting from the quality of adjudication”).  
178 See id. (“The tactical advantages of complexity and delay are greatest in small and mid-
size cases because opponents who are economically rational will change their settlement posture 
when litigation costs threaten to exceed the amount to be gained or saved by the case.”). 
179 See Moskowitz, supra note 134, at 125. 
  
2012] Nontranssubstantivity and Discovery Reform 271 
 
cases differently when the claim is valued under $50,000, when the claim is 
for more than $50,000, and when the case is “exceptional” and therefore 
subject to court-crafted discovery plans.180 Alaska rules limit discovery 
specifically in personal injury or property damages cases for less than 
$100,000.181 South Carolina rules allow physical or mental examinations only 
in cases where the amount in controversy is greater than $100,000182 and oral 
depositions only where the amount in controversy is greater than $10,000, 
unless the parties agree or the court orders the deposition.183 Additionally, 
parties may serve nonuniform interrogatories on other parties only in cases 
valued at $25,000 or more.184 
England has also implemented a system that applies different proce-
dures to cases based on the value of the claim. Prior to the reforms of 1999, 
document production procedure was based on the old English Judicature 
Acts of 1873 and 1875.185 Disclosure operated in a manner similar to that in 
the American system, except that relevancy was defined more narrowly.186 
In 1999, however, the English procedural system underwent major reforms 
led by Lord Woolf.187 The reforms were meant to emphasize case manage-
ment and pretrial research.188 Under the new rules, lawyers are subject to 
sanctions for filing frivolous writs.189 The reforms also heightened the 
pleading standards.190 The case management system operates along three 
tracks: small claims, mid-level claims worth £5000 to £15,000, and large 
claims worth over £15,000.191 The small claims track is handled with 
minimal supervision.192 The mid-level cases are put on a fast track to be 
adjudicated at a one-day hearing within thirty weeks of being assigned to 
that track.193 The larger cases, however, are given extensive hands-on judicial 
management.194 Thus, the English system combines value-of-claim tracking 
and active judicial case management. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
 
180 See Weber, supra note 23, at 1064-65. 
181 See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26(g). 
182 See S.C. R. CIV. P. 35(a). 
183 See id. 30(a)(2). 
184 See id. 33(b)(9). 
185 See Subrin, supra note 169, at 303-04 (describing recent developments in the English rules). 
186 Id.  
187 Id. at 304. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 305. 
191 Id. 
192 Miller, supra note 10, at 121.  
193 Id. 
194 Subrin, supra note 169, at 305. 
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reforms are working, with lawyers spending more time thinking about case 
strategy rather than engaging in a discovery war of monetary attrition.195 
Professors Stephen Burbank and Stephen Subrin have suggested im-
plementing a tracking system based on the value of the claim in the federal 
system.196 Like the British, they would adopt proportionality as the founda-
tional principle behind the discovery rules.197 The tracking system would 
help to ensure that discovery expenses are not disproportionate to the value 
of the underlying claim. Track assignments would be made along strict (if 
arbitrary) monetary guidelines,198 with the exception that cases in which 
private litigants play a role in enforcing public law would always be placed 
in the complex track.199 Track assignments would be made by federal 
judges—rather than court clerks—and would be unreviewable, ensuring that 
those assignments would not lead to additional disputes and create delay 
and expense.200 
For the simple-track cases, the expansive breadth of discovery currently 
available under the federal rules would not be proportional. The cost of the 
discovery allowed would greatly outweigh the significance of the case. 
Lower limits might be set on the number of depositions or interrogatories 
permissible.201 The rules might require more specificity in document 
requests.202 Because the simple cases usually involve little discovery under 
the current rules, the real cost savings would probably come in the ability to 
eliminate the many procedural requirements—such as mandatory disclosure, 
 
195 See id. 
196 Burbank & Subrin, supra note 170, at 408-12. 
197 Id. at 409. The British system places an emphasis on proportionality “(i) to the amount of 
money involved; (ii) to the importance of the case; (iii) to the complexity of the issues; and (iv) to 
the financial position of each party.” CIV. P.R. 1.1(2)(c) (Eng.), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/ 
civil/procrules_fin/contents/parts/part01.htm#IDATBTQ. 
198 Acknowledging that the line would need to be arbitrarily drawn, Professors Burbank and 
Subrin suggest that cases involving less than $500,000 in controversy be assigned to the simple 
track. Burbank & Subrin, supra note 170, at 411-12. 
199 Objective factors, such as statutory multiple damages provisions or fee-shifting provi-
sions, would determine when a private litigant was helping to enforce a public law. Id. at 411-12; 
Subrin, supra note 5, at 400; see also Weber, supra note 176, at 133 (noting that “not all cases that 
fall below the threshold should be subject to the small case rules” because “[s]ome cases, 
particularly civil rights and discrimination matters, embody claims for vindication that go beyond 
the dollar amount sought for recovery”). 
200 Burbank & Subrin, supra note 170, at 411 (noting that, to reduce “the likelihood of costly 
satellite litigation” over tracking decisions, courts must “provide sufficiently objective and 
determinate criteria for the initial decision and not . . . permit any appeal”). 
201 Id. at 410; Subrin, supra note 5, at 399. 
202 Subrin, supra note 5, at 399. 
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discovery conferences, and pretrial conferences—that have been imple-
mented in an attempt to control discovery in complex cases.203 
Value-of-claim tracks can be very useful in ensuring the proportionality 
of discovery. To the extent that the applicable procedures are determined 
solely based on the amount in controversy, such a system will ensure 
proportionality to the amount involved. The system will only allow for a 
vast expenditure of resources on discovery where the potential benefit or 
liability, measured by the potential outcome of the case, justifies such 
expenditure. 
However, a value-of-claims approach to nontranssubstantivity would 
not be enough to fix the discovery system. Discovery procedures that track 
only the amount in controversy might lead to the available procedures being 
disproportionate to the importance of the case, as measured not by the 
potential monetary award but rather by social gain or other factors.204 
Therefore, a value-of-claims system must be modified to create exceptions 
for certain types of cases, such as those involving private enforcement of 
public law, as suggested by Professors Burbank and Subrin.205 
Even a value-of-claims approach that accounts for nonmonetary measures 
of the importance of a case, however, would not ensure that discovery is 
proportionate to the complexity of the issues involved. For example, it may 
be necessary to afford broader discovery mechanisms in a securities fraud 
case valued at $50 million than a simple contract case valued at the same 
amount. To achieve proportionality that actually corresponds to the impor-
tance of the case, the procedures must be attuned to the type of case. 
A pure value-of-claims approach would also fail to tailor the available 
discovery devices as narrowly as possible to the substance of the litigation. 
For instance, it may be that the proper limitations on discovery in a medical 
malpractice case would permit more physical examinations but would limit 
the potential for document discovery. Assigning procedures to cases based 
solely on the value of the claim would not allow for a way to make these 
adjustments. 
Finally, as Professors Burbank and Subrin note, a value-of-claims system 
would not rein in the costs of discovery in high-stakes cases on the complex 
 
203 See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 170, at 409-10; Subrin, supra note 5, at 399-400. 
204 Moreover, it would be difficult to valuate claims for injunctive relief. Professor Weber 
has suggested dealing with this problem by exempting almost all cases for injunctive relief from 
the simple-claims track. Weber, supra note 176, at 134. 
205 See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 170, at 411-12 (recommending that “cases implicating 
the private enforcement of public law” not be termed “simple” cases because “broader discovery 
than that available in the simple case track may be necessary for adequate enforcement”). 
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track.206 The complex track would still need to allow for a range of broad 
discovery procedures for the cases that actually require them. Other cases 
that are placed on the complex track based on a high amount in controversy 
and that do not actually require expansive discovery would still present the 
potential for inefficient overuse or abuse of discovery. 
V. CREATING A SYSTEM OF NONTRANSSUBSTANTIVE RULES  
TO FIT MODERN DISCOVERY 
A. A Nontranssubstantive Discovery Alternative 
A system of nontranssubstantive discovery rules that will provide for 
efficient case management and reduce the overuse and abuse of discovery 
will begin with case-type–specific discovery rules, but will also likely need 
to include elements of both an active judicial case management model and a 
value-of-claim tracking model. The base of the discovery system should be 
nontranssubstantive at the case-type level so that the discovery devices and 
their permitted scope will respond most closely to the issues that are most 
important to the claims. Because each type of claim will present different 
needs, case-type–specific nontranssubstantive rules will permit rulemakers 
to craft discovery procedures more narrowly. 
However, it may be necessary to make alterations in the discovery rules 
based on the value of the claim even once the procedures are narrowed in 
type and scope to the needs of the substantive area. These further altera-
tions would diminish the opportunity for overuse of discovery. Value-of-
claims distinctions can also ensure that discovery-narrowing mechanisms, 
such as disclosure or discovery conferences, are not employed where their 
cost is disproportionate to the amount in controversy. Thus, even though 
different discovery rules will apply in different types of litigation, more 
general rules might declare that, regardless of the applicable set of rules, 
automatic initial disclosures will not be required in any case where the 
amount in controversy is less than $250,000.207 
Finally, active judicial management will also be necessary in certain 
types of complex litigation. Discovery in the most complex types of cases 
with a large amount in controversy cannot be totally delimited ex ante. The 
particular demands of these cases will sometimes require a judge to consider 
the discovery demanded in the context of the case. Prior to the start of 
 
206 Burbank & Subrin, supra note 170, at 412. 
207 Such mechanisms will not necessarily be available for every type of case. Litigation in 
some substantive areas may be so simple that a discovery conference would be unnecessary 
regardless of the value of the claim.  
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discovery, judges may also need to take an active role in clarifying the 
procedures to be followed in cases that touch upon multiple substance areas. 
Although judicial discretion will give rise to concerns of partiality, a certain 
degree of unpredictability, and the other problems discussed above,208 such 
discretion can never be totally eliminated. The goal of crafting narrow, 
nontranssubstantive rules is to reduce the amount of discretion that 
individual judges will need to exercise, thereby lessening these concerns. 
A system of layered nontranssubstantivity like that proposed would help 
to ensure proportionality in a number of different ways.209 The base of case-
type–specific rules will ensure that discovery is proportional to the com-
plexity of the issues and the social importance of the litigation. Rulemakers 
would allow for broader discovery in types of litigation where the issues are 
not as clear, but narrow the scope of discovery in litigation where the issues 
are more likely to be straightforward, thus limiting the opportunity for abuse. 
Rules that apply differently based on the size of the claim will ensure 
that the resources spent in the conduct of litigation are proportionate to the 
value of the judgment at stake. Further, active judicial case management 
will allow judges to tailor the rules to the particulars of the case at bar and 
ensure that discovery remains proportional to the resources of the individual 
parties. 
B. Accounting for Value-Based Judgments in the  
Creation of Nontranssubstantive Rules 
As discussed above, one of the major advantages of using nontrans-
substantive rules is the possibility of reducing waste and abuse by narrowly 
tailoring discovery procedures to the needs of particular types of cases. 
Another of the major advantages of using nontranssubstantive rules is that 
they allow rulemakers to curb discovery costs selectively by limiting 
discovery in some types of cases while allowing more expansive discovery in 
others. In so doing, rulemakers can consider the substantive goals of the 
laws. Rulemakers might decide that high discovery costs are acceptable in 
certain types of litigation but unnecessary or counterproductive in others. 
In making these determinations, rulemakers should consider both how 
discovery can promote procedural justice as well as how it can aid in the 
effective enforcement of the laws. Rather than trying to separate procedure 
 
208 Largely unfettered judicial discretion takes desirable control away from litigants and 
imposes an undesirable burden on judicial time and resources. See supra notes 164-75 and 
accompanying text. 
209 For a description of different measures of proportionality considered by the British 
procedural system, see infra text accompanying note 216. 
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from substantive law, rulemakers can embrace the impact that discovery 
rules can have on the outcome of litigation. If discovery is going to be an 
expensive process, the costs should be targeted to where they can be most 
effective, both in giving the parties access to information and in promoting 
substantive goals. 
1. Using Discovery to Promote Procedural Justice 
Before rulemakers create a system of nontranssubstantive rules, they 
must first determine which factors to consider. In many ways, these guiding 
principles will be the same as those that are always employed when rule-
makers craft procedural rules. However, because nontransubstantive rules 
will be narrowly crafted to fit the substance of litigation, their potential 
effect on outcomes will be more obvious. As opposed to the drafting of 
transsubstantive rules, where rulemakers can pretend that procedure is a 
value-free science,210 the crafting of substance-specific procedures will require 
rulemakers to confront openly the challenge of making value judgments. 
Stephen Subrin identifies ten values that procedure may be designed to 
serve: 
(1) resolving and ending disputes peacefully; (2) efficiency; (3) fulfilling 
societal norms through law-application; (4) accurate ascertainment of facts; 
(5) predictability; (6) enhancing human dignity; (7) adding legitimacy and 
stability to government and society; (8) permitting citizens to partake in 
governance; (9) aiding the growth and improvement of law; (10) restraining 
or enhancing power.211 
I would add to this list the value of equal treatment of the parties. 
Rulemakers may also take a sociological approach by designing procedure 
that keeps in mind the political, social, and economic effects of the rules.212 
In designing substance-specific procedure, rulemakers will have the op-
portunity and challenge of deciding which of these values will be given 
primary emphasis in each type of litigation. Rulemakers may decide to 
create discovery rules for civil rights litigation that will place more emphasis 
on human dignity or community participation. Conversely, the procedure 
to be utilized in contract disputes may place more emphasis on predictability. 
 
210 See supra text accompanying notes 88-91 (discussing the view that procedure and substan-
tive law are separate and distinct in the context of the Rules Enabling Act and the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure). 
211 Stephen N. Subrin, On Thinking About a Description of a Country’s Civil Procedure, 7 TUL. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 139, 140 (1999). 
212 Id. at 142. 
  
2012] Nontranssubstantivity and Discovery Reform 277 
 
More extensive discovery might thus be needed in civil rights litigation to 
impart a feeling of transparency in such matters. On the other hand, 
predictability might be obtained in contract disputes by strictly limiting 
discovery to a certain set of documents so that the parties know ex ante 
what facts the counterparty will be able to obtain in any litigation that 
might result. 
Discovery, like many areas of procedure, presents an opportunity for 
rulemakers to craft processes that will contribute greatly to procedural 
justice. If litigants are to come away from the courts feeling that they were 
afforded a fair adjudication of their claim, they must feel that they were 
given an adequate opportunity both to obtain the facts critical to their case 
and to present those facts to an impartial court. Unnecessarily limited 
discovery procedures may leave litigants with the feeling that they were 
helpless in their quest to find and convince the court of the truth. This 
concern looms especially large in litigation where a party with fewer 
resources files suit against a more powerful, better-resourced adversary. The 
smaller party must be made to feel that it has been given the opportunity to 
develop fairly the factual record in spite of the inequalities. Of course, this 
concern needs to be balanced against the needs of their counterparties, 
usually corporations or government, to be free from harassing, meritless 
lawsuits. Procedural justice also dictates that defendants not leave the courts 
feeling that they can be bullied by frivolous but expensive lawsuits. 
A recent study by the Federal Judicial Center asked attorneys whether 
they believed that the discovery produced in one of their recent closed cases 
increased the fairness of the outcome in that case.213 About 45% of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys and 39% of defendants’ attorneys agreed or strongly agreed that 
the discovery increased the fairness of the outcome.214 Only about 12% of 
plaintiffs’ attorneys and 14% of defendants’ attorneys disagreed or strongly 
disagreed with the statement, with the rest ambivalent or declining to 
answer.215 Further research should determine in which types of cases 
discovery contributed the most to perceived fairness of outcome. Such data 
could greatly assist rulemakers in crafting discovery rules that would best 
leave litigants with the feeling that they were afforded procedural justice, 
regardless of the outcome of their case. 
Another factor that should be taken into account in crafting non-
transsubstantive discovery rules is proportionality. Since the reforms of 
1999, the British procedural system has sought to attain four types of 
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proportionality: “(i) to the amount of money involved; (ii) to the impor-
tance of the case; (iii) to the complexity of the issues; and (iv) to the 
financial position of each party.”216 As discussed above, nontranssubstantive 
rules are particularly well-suited to provide proportionality in each of these 
areas.217  
Other considerations for rulemakers include looking at who has access to 
the information and how much discovery is necessary to make that infor-
mation available to both parties. Additionally, in crafting rules of discovery, 
rulemakers will have to confront the question of deciding who should bear 
the cost of discovery. The 1938 rules shifted the cost of discovery to the 
producing party. Rulemakers must acknowledge that this is a normative 
choice that will usually favor plaintiffs, because defendants usually have 
access to the information and are thus the producing party. Rulemakers will 
need to be conscious of how this choice affects incentives to litigate or to 
settle.218 
Finally, rulemakers need to recognize that more information is not al-
ways better. There is an endless amount of information and at some point 
the cost of uncovering that information outweighs the marginal benefit.219 
There must be limits to discovery and its potentially enormous costs, even 
at the risk of missing critical information in some cases. Thus, it is time to 
reconsider Sunderland’s effort to make all types of discovery available to 
every litigant.220 
When crafting substance-specific procedure, rulemakers are forced to 
make value-based decisions about what processes to implement in different 
types of litigation. One danger in crafting procedure in this way is that it 
opens up the process to influence from interest groups. However, this 
problem can be dealt with through transparency and by allocating the task 
of rulemaking to the correct bodies.221 
 
216 CIV. P.R. 1.1(2)(c) (Eng.), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/contents/ 
parts/part01.htm#IDATBTQ. 
217 See supra text accompanying note 209. 
218 See generally Avery Wiener Katz & Chris William Sanchirico, Fee Shifting in Litigation: 
Survey and Assessment (Univ. of Pa. L. Sch. Inst. for L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 10-30, 2010), 
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1714089 (surveying economic literature on the effects of 
fee-shifting on incentives to expend resources in litigation, decisions to bring suit, settlement 
strategies, and incentives for efficient primary behavior). 
219 Cf. Subrin, supra note 211, at 147 (suggesting that this insight likely comes from the law 
and economics movement). 
220 On Sunderland as the main architect of the federal discovery rules, see supra Section I.B. 
221 See infra Section V.D (proposing and highlighting the benefits of a potential structure for 
such a rulemaking body). 
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2. Using Discovery to Promote Substantive Goals 
Procedure can be used to promote substantive goals and achieve substan-
tive fairness the same way that it can be designed to optimize procedural 
fairness. In designing nontranssubstantive rules, rulemakers must determine 
to what degree they want to craft procedures that will promote the substan-
tive goals of litigation. Framed another way, rulemakers will have to 
consider whether they want to allow more discovery in certain types of 
cases—and thus higher discovery costs—in order to promote the substantive 
goals underlying the litigation. Private litigation that enforces federal 
statutes constitutes a particular set of cases in which rulemakers may want 
to further substantive goals. 
Recent literature has recognized that it is often a matter of legislative 
choice to encourage private litigation as an enforcement mechanism for 
federal law.222 In a recent book on the topic, Professor Sean Farhang notes 
that there has been a shift since the 1960s from a bureaucracy-centered 
approach to enforcement to a private litigation approach.223 When Congress 
encourages private litigation, it in effect enlists citizens as law enforcement 
officials.224 For example, by allowing private citizens to file suit for em-
ployment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 
Congress created less need for federal agencies to oversee compliance.225 
Congress can encourage such private litigation by influencing access to 
the plaintiff status,226 the expected benefits of litigation,227 the probability of 
prevailing,228 or the expected cost of the litigation.229 Granting broad 
discovery rights in this kind of litigation confers upon private litigants the 
kind of investigatory powers normally bestowed upon federal agencies, such 
as the power to compel sworn testimony or the production of documents.230 
 
222 See FARHANG, supra note 10, at 3 (“The existence and extent of private litigation enforc-
ing a statute is to an important degree the product of legislative choice over questions of statutory 
design.”). 
223 Id. at 4. 
224 Id. at 9. 
225 See id. at 4, 98-114 (describing Congress’s choice to encourage a robust scheme of private 
enforcement of the Civil Rights Act in lieu of a stronger administrative enforcement authority). 
226 Access to plaintiff status can be affected by granting broader citizen standing, lengthening 
statutes of limitations, or allowing for class actions. Id. at 25-28. 
227 Providing for minimum damages or triple damages will raise the potential award for a 
successful plaintiff. Id. at 28-30.  
228 The probability of prevailing can be influenced through, among other things, changing 
burdens of proof, standards of proof, or rules of evidence. Id. at 28 & tbl.2.2. 
229 Filing fees and attorney fee–shifting provisions are examples of ways in which the expected 
cost of litigation can be altered. Id.  
230 Id. at 8. 
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Granting broader discovery rights will increase the probability of a plaintiff 
prevailing. 
Allowing for private litigation in this manner is a conscious and substan-
tive choice by the legislature to increase the level of enforcement of the 
underlying law. Professor Farhang notes that the reasons a legislature would 
favor enforcement through private litigation are political.231 Conflicts 
between the legislative and executive branches will push Congress to rely 
on private litigation as a method of statutory implementation, as a way to 
bypass the enforcement role of a hostile executive branch.232 Derailing 
private enforcement can only be done through the difficult legislative 
process of repeal and cannot be accomplished by the Executive alone.233 
Professors Burbank and Subrin would create exceptions in their value-
of-claim tracking system for litigation where Congress meant to encourage 
private enforcement (seen through statutory damages, attorney fee–shifting 
provisions, or other objectively identifiable signals).234 They see broader 
discovery rules for these cases as a way of promoting the legislative intent 
of “adequate enforcement.”235 Although procedural rules can and should be 
used as a means of affecting underlying substantive rights by modifying the 
level of enforcement, this is an area in which the judicial branch should 
avoid interfering. If a robust system of private enforcement is the result of 
conflict between the political branches of government, the judicial branch 
may be best served by not taking sides. The decision to allow more robust 
discovery in certain types of cases is better left to Congress than judicial 
rulemakers.236 
Nontranssubstantive rules have the advantage that procedures can be 
crafted in ways that will promote the substantive goals of particular sets of 
law. Discovery rules should be utilized to encourage citizen enforcement of 
the laws, and should be seen as an effective tool in the attainment of litigant 
rights in many substantive areas. Procedure plays a large role in influencing 
substantive outcomes. In crafting nontranssubstantive rules, rulemakers will 
certainly have to, and should, decide how they can influence the rights of 
the parties through the rules. Indeed, Congress has shown its willingness to 
 
231 See id. at 19-20. 
232 Id. at 36. 
233 Id. at 5. 
234 Burbank & Subrin, supra note 170, at 411. 
235 Id. 
236 Recognition of these concerns may explain why courts of equity have traditionally seen it 
as outside of their role to promote the enforcement of penalty provisions. See supra note 96. As noted 
above, penalty provisions can be a mechanism used by the legislature to adjust the level of private 
enforcement of the law. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
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alter procedure as a method of accomplishing its substantive goals.237 
However, one should be wary about allowing rulemakers in the judicial 
branch to make these determinations, as Congress has demonstrated that it 
will alter procedural rules where it finds such adjustment necessary to 
calibrate the level of enforcement of particular statutes.238 
C. Discovery Reforms that Will Reduce Costs 
There are a number of possible changes to the discovery rules that rule-
makers should consider in their efforts to reduce the cost of discovery. First, 
where the type or size of a case makes initial required disclosures unneces-
sary or inefficient, the disclosure rules should not apply. For those types of 
cases where certain sets of information will always aid the litigation process, 
a required core of discovery should mandate disclosure of that information 
with as much specificity as possible.239 
Further, pattern interrogatories and pattern requests for production 
should be developed to make basic discovery more efficient and less 
costly.240 Pattern discovery rules would set forth the types of requests that 
should be honored quickly and without dispute.241 Parties would use pattern 
discovery requests as necessary. There would be a strong presumption that 
interrogatories and requests for production set out in such rules would be 
 
237 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (discussing procedural reforms in the 
context of prison litigation and securities litigation). 
238 The rulemaking committee should therefore be situated in the legislative branch. See infra 
Section V.D. 
239 See Subrin, supra note 114, at 48 (advocating a clear description of the required core 
discovery in particular types of cases). 
240 See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text (describing recent efforts to develop pattern 
discovery for employment discrimination litigation); supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text 
(describing pattern interrogatories in the states). The recent efforts to develop pattern discovery 
in the federal system represent an important start to this process. Pattern discovery should be 
developed for litigation in a wide range of substantive areas. 
241 An initial proposal by the National Employment Lawyers Association demonstrates the 
types of pattern interrogatories and pattern requests for production that might be used in an 
employment discrimination case. Pattern interrogatories might ask the defendant to state the 
reasons for the adverse action taken against the plaintiff, describe any workplace misconduct 
allegedly committed by the plaintiff, and list the identities of any other employees against whom 
the defendant took the challenged responsive action. Memorandum from Garrison & Hamburg, 
supra note 106, at attachment 2, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/ 
rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2010-11.pdf at 630-35. Pattern requests for production might ask 
the defendant to produce the plaintiff’s personnel file, the plaintiff’s compensation records, 
documents and communications related to any investigation of any complaint made by the 
plaintiff, and any documents describing the reasons for the adverse action taken against the 
plaintiff. Id. at attachment 3, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/ 
Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2010-11.pdf at 636-39. 
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reasonable; parties would thus be discouraged from disputing such requests. 
Parties to litigation would know to expect requests for the materials set 
forth in the pattern discovery rules and would be expected to answer 
interrogatories or produce requested records quickly. Pattern discovery would 
speed the initial stages of discovery and, by reducing discovery disputes at 
this stage, reduce the cost of initial discovery. Pattern discovery also has the 
added benefit of making clear to pro se litigants the basic materials that will 
help them to develop their cases. 
While many cases may not require discovery beyond that prescribed in 
the required core discovery or pattern discovery provisions, further reforms 
are necessary for those cases that will require extensive discovery beyond 
those initial requests. A recent report by the American College of Trial 
Lawyers Task Force on Discovery and the Institute for Advancement of the 
American Legal System listed nine suggested reforms to cut the costs of 
discovery: 
 (1) limitations on scope of discovery (i.e., changes in the definition of 
relevance);  
(2) limitations on persons from whom discovery can be sought;  
(3) limitations on the types of discovery (e.g., only document discovery, 
not interrogatories);  
(4) numerical limitations (e.g., only 20 interrogatories or requests for 
admissions; only 50 hours of deposition time); 
(5) elimination of depositions of experts where their testimony is strictly 
limited to the contents of their written report; 
(6) limitations on the time available for discovery;  
(7) cost shifting/co-pay rules;  
(8) financial limitations (i.e., limits on the amount of money that can be 
spent—or that one party can require its opponent to spend—on discovery); 
and  
(9) discovery budgets that are approved by the clients and the court.242  
These limitations would generally be presumptive rules subject to altera-
tion by the court upon a showing of good cause.243 Examining specific types 
of cases would allow rulemakers to consider what information is generally 
known to the parties at different stages of the litigation and what the norms 
are for the numbers of depositions and interrogatories or the types or 
 
242 IAALS REPORT, supra note 1, at 10-11. 
243 See Subrin, supra note 114, at 48 (“Although cases of certain varieties have predictable, 
normal characteristics, presumptive rules would permit parties to seek, and judges to order, 
variations when the case has unique problems.”). 
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amounts of documents subject to discovery.244 Rulemakers would also be 
able to gauge the level of specificity with which litigants should be able to 
make discovery requests in different types of litigation.245 Using this kind of 
empirical evidence to create limiting rules will constrain parties and reduce 
abuse of the discovery system. It will also provide clients, lawyers, and 
judges with more predictability. 
Another reform might be to simplify discovery procedures in types of 
cases in which pro se representation is more common or encouraged.246 For 
instance, discovery rules might be simplified in certain types of prisoner 
litigation, in which over 93% of cases are filed pro se.247 This would aid 
litigants unfamiliar with the technical procedures of the courts. 
The greatest source of cost and the most difficult discovery device to 
limit is document discovery.248 Requiring greater specificity in demands for 
documents, where possible, may help reduce the costs of searching for and 
producing those documents.249 Another possible reform would be to set a 
presumptive time window for discoverable documents (i.e., documents 
created within a set number of years prior to the alleged illegal or harmful 
conduct).250 Creating nontranssubstantive rules would allow each of these 
reforms to reflect the unique opportunities and problems presented by 
varying types of litigation. Narrowly tailored rules would reduce the need 
for judicial case management, although the rules would be subject to 
alteration by the court for good cause, to allow for needed flexibility in 
unusual or unforeseen circumstances. 
D. The Rulemaking Body 
The complexity of nontranssubstantive rules and the challenge that they 
present in making value judgments keyed to specific areas of litigation will 
require innovative rulemaking processes. Professors Burbank and Subrin 
have suggested that rulemakers work with the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ 
 
244 See generally id. at 49. 
245 Id. 
246 Cf. S.C. R. FAM. CT. 25 (prohibiting formal depositions or discovery in family court 
proceedings, except upon stipulation of the parties or order of the court). 
247 See Judicial Business tbl.S-23, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/Judicial 
Business/JudicialBusiness.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/tables/S23Sep09.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (providing data on pro se filings across the states). 
248 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
249 See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 170, at 411. 
250 Id. 
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bars to develop discovery protocols.251 Their proposal presents the possibil-
ity that through discussion and negotiation, innovative solutions can be 
found to address the rising burdens of discovery.252 It also ensures that the 
most knowledgeable experts in each substantive field of litigation have a 
role in shaping the procedures to be used. This proposed process for 
discovery reform is similar to that used by administrative agencies in 
negotiated rulemaking.253 Because nontranssubstantive discovery rules will 
necessarily be more complex and will have to respond to the particularities 
of different types of litigation, this process of expert-based reform would be 
a much better method of crafting rules than leaving the job solely to 
procedural generalists. 
There have been previous efforts to make rules through committees of 
this kind. An effort led by the National Employment Lawyers Association 
brings together various stakeholders to develop pattern discovery for 
employment discrimination litigation.254 A group composed of members of 
the plaintiffs’ employment bar, NELA is working with a group from the 
Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, a group of 
management-side attorneys.255 This effort seeks to identify which discovery 
requests are acceptable on all sides and can be streamlined. Including judges 
in a committee of this type would help to determine what works from the 
judiciary’s perspective.256 
 There is a further question regarding whether the judicial branch can 
properly make nontranssubstantive discovery rules. The Rules Enabling 
Act, which authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, directs that procedural rules “shall not abridge, enlarge 
 
251 Id. at 412; see also Subrin, supra note 5, at 405 (suggesting also possibly including clients in 
the rulemaking process). 
252 But see Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legit-
imacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 916 (1999) (“[I]nsofar as consensus involves 
accommodating conflicting interests, it aligns court rulemaking so closely with legislation that it is 
unclear why the rulemaking task should be given to the courts at all.”). 
253 See Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 7 (1982) 
(proposing that regulatory rules be made by “group consensus” reached through “negotiation 
among representatives of the interested parties, including administrative agencies”). 
254 See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text (discussing NELA’s attempt to tailor 
discovery mechanisms to the substance of the litigation). 
255 See Memorandum from Garrison & Hamburg, supra note 106, at 1-2 (describing the 
formation of an Employment Protocols Committee); Memorandum from Kravitz, supra note 105, 
at 14 (describing the committee as “including strong representation of both plaintiff and defense 
lawyers”). 
256 Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Draft Minutes 32 (Nov. 15–16, 2010), available at http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2011-04.pdf at 56. 
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or modify any substantive right.”257 Under the Supreme Court’s current 
interpretation of this clause, the proper test for determining the validity of 
a judicially promulgated rule is “whether a rule really regulates procedure,—
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substan-
tive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or 
infraction of them.”258 Although case-type–specific discovery rules might be 
permissible under this wooden reading of the Rules Enabling Act, they 
might modify substantive rights. In nontranssubstantive rulemaking, rule-
makers would undoubtedly be forced to make value judgments in their 
determinations of which rules should apply in which types of cases. The 
discovery system that resulted from such a practice would surely “modify” 
substantive rights. 
By directing that procedures promulgated by the Supreme Court should 
avoid modifying the substantive law, the Rules Enabling Act implies that 
value neutrality is possible (and indeed desirable) in procedure.259 As noted 
above, the goal of value neutrality was one factor that pushed the drafters of 
the original federal rules toward transsubstantivity.260 But more recently, 
scholars have attacked the notion of value-neutral procedures.261 The 
substantive nature of procedure becomes even more obvious, however, in 
nontranssubstantive rules, and it is inevitable that in crafting nontranssub-
stantive rules, rulemakers will be forced to make value-based decisions 
affecting substantive rights. The substantive nature of such rules would be 
more apparent still if rulemakers were to shape discovery rules to respond 
to signs in legislation—such as fee-shifting provisions or statutory damages—
and strengthen a legislative intent to promote private litigation as an 
enforcement mechanism of statutory law.262 To the extent that more 
expansive discovery encourages litigation by increasing the chances that the 
plaintiff will prevail, it modifies the existing rights and liabilities of those 
governed by the laws. Thus, under the current statutory scheme allocating 
 
257 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
258 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). 
259 See Marcus, supra note 85, at 395-97 (describing contemporary views about the “substance–
procedure dichotomy”). 
260 See supra text accompanying notes 88-92 (describing reasons for the rulemakers’ choice of 
transsubstantive rules). 
261 See Bone, supra note 252, at 907-14 (“The traditional belief in a procedural ideal and a 
clear normative divide between procedure and substance is no longer persuasive.”); Stephen B. 
Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1472-73 (1987) (book review) (challeng-
ing the neutrality thesis). The Supreme Court, too, has noted that court rules are “substantive and 
political in the sense that the rules of procedure have important effects on the substantive rights of 
litigants.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989). 
262 See supra subsection V.B.2. 
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rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court, Congress would probably be 
required to enact nontranssubstantive discovery rules itself. 
Even if Congress were to grant expanded authority to the Supreme 
Court to promulgate discovery rules along the lines outlined in this Article, 
the legislative branch would nevertheless be the more appropriate forum for 
the development of such rules.263 Nontranssubstantive rules provide 
expanded opportunities for interest groups to influence rulemakers.264 They 
also present opportunities for negotiation and compromise among interested 
groups.265 The legislative branch is the more appropriate institution for 
consensus-building and managing the politics of competing interest 
groups.266 Nevertheless, the judiciary should be actively involved in the 
 
263 There will certainly be some rules that can be made properly by a committee situated in 
the judicial branch. Some rules are truly procedural in that they deal with how the courts conduct 
their business. Compliance with these rules is simple for all parties interested in duly pressing 
their claims or defenses; these rules neither modify the substantive rights of the parties nor affect 
their chances of prevailing in the litigation. Examples of such rules might include time limits for 
simple filings, requirements that the parties use certain forms, or rules governing the ways in 
which the parties communicate with each other or the court. These rules are best formulated by a 
committee in the judicial branch, whose members are more likely to be acquainted with court 
procedure in a way that helps them formulate rules for the expedient functioning of the courts. 
The Rules Enabling Act currently provides that federal rules take effect automatically after 
promulgation by the Supreme Court and a waiting period in which Congress can override the 
proposed rules. 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2006). For truly procedural rules, this system works best in that 
rules designed to aid the conduct of judicial business can be made effective without Congress 
having to undertake the slow legislative process of statutory enactment. This Comment asserts 
only that rules that will have more of a substantive effect on litigants’ rights, including substance-
specific discovery rules that impact a litigant’s access to information that may be critical to his 
case, are better crafted in a legislative committee and enacted by Congress. Cf. Stephen B. 
Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural Law for International Civil Litigation, 57 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 145-46 (1994) (suggesting a two-tiered system in which rules more 
properly made through legislation would be formulated and recommended by the current 
rulemaking committee, but would require legislative action before taking effect). 
264 Cf. supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text (explaining how transsubstantive rules 
reduce the risk of interest group influence). 
265 See supra notes 251-56 and accompanying text. 
266 Professor Paul Stancil argues that committee rulemaking helps to lessen the influence of 
interest groups. See Paul J. Stancil, Close Enough for Government Work: The Committee Rulemaking 
Game, 96 VA. L. REV. 69, 119-21 (2010) (“[C]ommittee rulemaking enjoys substantial advantages 
over other potential forms of procedural system design in the form of expertise advantages and 
insulation from interest group risk.”). Professor Stancil points out two factors that may lead to 
interest groups having less influence over committee rulemaking than rulemaking by Congress 
members: (1) because of Congress members’ lack of expertise in judicial procedure and the scarcity 
of Congress’s time, Congress relies on interest groups for information, thereby opening up 
Congress members to misinformation; (2) unlike Congress members, the judges and academics 
who make up the rule advisory committees do not rely on campaign contributions from interest 
groups to get reelected. Id. at 120. To the extent that lobbying does take place even in committee 
rulemaking, and to the extent that it would increase with a nontranssubstantive system, a 
committee of judges, academics, and lawyers located in the legislative branch would benefit from 
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rulemaking process, as it is clearly better equipped to evaluate existing 
procedures and create an integrated system of rules.267 Thus, the ideal 
rulemaking body would be a committee created by Congress and subject to 
congressional oversight, but led by representatives of the judiciary and 
composed of judges, law professors, members of the relevant bars, and 
major repeat clients interested in the substantive field. 
CONCLUSION 
The demand for discovery reform is widespread and the need for such 
reform, at least in some types of cases, is apparent. To some, the problems 
with the current system of discovery stem from abuse and overuse of the 
system that costs litigants unreasonable amounts, thereby keeping plaintiffs 
with meritorious suits out of court and forcing defendants who should 
prevail on the merits to the settlement table. Although exorbitant discovery 
does occur in some cases, the degree to which runaway discovery costs 
actually accrue and create these pressures on litigants is uncertain; more 
empirical research is necessary. To others, the problems with discovery 
stem from needless procedures that make the cost of litigation in simple 
cases too high for many plaintiffs and drain the resources of the federal 
courts and judiciary. Although the empirical evidence of the costs created 
by needless discovery procedures is uncertain, these charges are also surely 
accurate in some cases. 
Nontranssubstantive discovery rules, and in particular subject matter-
specific discovery rules, could provide a useful mechanism through which 
rulemakers redraft discovery rules more narrowly. A nontranssubstantive 
system of discovery rules would begin with rules that vary based on type of 
case and respond to the unique needs and circumstances presented by 
different types of litigation. Some further layer of value-of-claim tracking 
would ensure that discovery is kept proportional to the value of the case. 
Active judicial case management would be appropriate only in the most 
complex cases and for issues that cannot be predicted by rulemakers 
creating a system ex ante. These reforms would prevent some of the abuse 
 
the same insulating factors as a committee located in the judicial branch. Because such lobbying is 
certain to occur, moving the rulemaking process to the legislative branch would protect the 
character and reputation of the judicial branch. Additionally, a closer relationship with Congress 
should help the rulemaking committee consider competing interests openly and reach satisfactory 
compromises. See Bone, supra note 252, at 916-17 (“The legislature is the institution in our 
democracy that is designed to accommodate interests . . . .”). 
267 See Bone, supra note 252, at 890 (“Court rulemaking is better suited than legislation to 
the task of inferring general principles from existing practice and designing an integrated system 
of rules based on those principles.”). 
  
288 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 243 
 
of discovery in cases in which discovery costs are currently too high by 
narrowly tailoring rules to case type. They would ensure that discovery is 
kept relevant to the issues at hand and is conducted in the most efficacious 
manner given the unique needs of such litigation. A nontranssubstantive 
discovery system would also help to eliminate unnecessary discovery 
procedures in cases in which minimal or no discovery is needed, thereby 
helping to reduce costs for small-claims plaintiffs and the judicial system. 
These savings would also allow judges to spend more time fulfilling their 
primary function of overseeing trials. 
A system of nontranssubstantive rules as described above would surely be 
much more complex than the current system of discovery. However, proce-
dure in small claims would often be made simpler by nontranssubstantive 
rules, and the specialist lawyers who litigate the more complex cases would 
easily be able to comprehend the intricacies of the discovery rules relevant 
to their line of work. Furthermore, because discovery rules would be more 
narrowly tailored to the needs of the case, the rules would apply in a more 
logical way to the particular litigation. 
To say only that a nontranssubstantive system will reduce waste and 
abuse through the creation of narrowly tailored rules, however, is to ignore 
one of the major advantages of nontranssubstantive rules: substance-specific 
rules will also allow rulemakers to allocate the costs of discovery. More 
expensive discovery could be allowed, or even encouraged, in certain types 
of cases in order to promote goals of substantive and procedural fairness. In 
this way, the discovery process can be harnessed as a tool to promote the 
underlying goals of the substantive law. More extensive discovery might be 
allowed in cases in which it is necessary to achieve procedural justice for the 
parties or those in which it will result in better enforcement of the law. 
A primary difficulty that would certainly arise in drafting nontrans-
substantive rules is that rulemakers would need to make value-based decisions 
in crafting those rules. The rulemaking process would become the target of 
interest group activity even more than it already is. The rulemaking process 
outlined above, which gathers key players together to draft the rules 
through a process of negotiation and compromise, would help to smooth the 
process of reform. Placing a rulemaking committee entrusted with this kind 
of reform of the discovery procedures in the legislative branch would best 
comport with functional and political realities. 
Discovery reform toward nontranssubstantive rules would be a massive 
undertaking. The result would be a much larger set of discovery rules, 
although the set of discovery rules applicable to any particular case would 
be smaller. Such a reform would probably take a considerable amount of 
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time.268 Rulemakers could start by creating discovery rules applicable in 
broad categories of cases (e.g., personal injury, employment) and then 
subdivide those categories with more particular sets of rules as necessary. 
Further research should demonstrate in which types of cases discovery leads 
to the most waste and abuse; rulemakers should focus their initial efforts on 
these types of cases.269 
*      *      * 
The current discovery system imposes costs on litigants and the court 
system that are too burdensome to ignore. Although a move to non-
transsubstantive discovery rules would be a radical change for the federal 
court system, movement in that direction has already occurred at the state 
level and, to a minimal degree, at the federal level. Such a system offers 
the promise of lower costs for litigants and the federal courts. Nontrans-
substantive rules would also ensure that the remaining costs would be 
allocated in a more deliberate and effective manner. Rather than condemning 
all discovery, perhaps it is time to tailor discovery rules to litigation. 
 
268 Such a large undertaking would not be unprecedented. The restyling project, which sought 
to change the words and style of nearly all of the federal rules, took nearly a decade and a half to 
complete. Jeremy Counseller, Rooting for the Restyled Rules (Even Though I Opposed Them), 78 MISS. 
L.J. 519, 521 (2009). 
269 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
